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When a judgment' rendered by a court of a sister state or foreign na-
tion is sought to be enforced, the court of the forum occupies a position
unfamiliar to it. It is not asked to adjudicate a case, but rather is asked
to make the action of another court effective in the forum by issuing a judg-
ment, which can be enforced upon property in the forum or the person
of a defendant who is before it. It does not pass on the merits of the claim
or apply substantive law, either its own or that of another state. It merely
uses the foreign judgment as a model upon which to base its own judgment.
There would seem to be a natural judicial reluctance to perform this func-
tion, particularly when the forum court may disagree with the result in
the state of rendition. But if there is ever to be an end to litigation,
judgments of other courts must be recognized, and the forum must make
available its enforcement processes to the successful suitor. The common
law rule is that the forum will recognize a judgment of another state2 unless
the case comes within certain exceptions to the general principles of rec-
ognition.3 Recognition is also in issue when a judgment in favor of the
defendant rendered elsewhere is aserted as a bar to a suit on the same
claim in the forum.
A. Ful Faith, and. Credit
In the United States the result is required as to judgments of sister
*Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. We will be dealing both with true judgments and with decrees. We will
use "judgment" as the generic term, and the judgment-decree distinction will be
drawn only when necessary.
2. We are using the word "state" in the conflicts sense, that is, a geographic
portion of the earth's surface having an independent system of law. We will use
the term "sister state" to refer to a state of the union. Thus, Puerto Rico is a
state in the conflicts sense, though it is not a state of the union. The United
States is a state in the conflicts sense, since there is a body of federal law. The
Province of Quebec, for example, would also be a state.
3. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAws § 430 (1934). A classical discus-
sion of the general principles of recognition will be found in Paine v. Schnectady
Ins. Co., 11 R.I. 411 (1877). See also Godard v. Gray [1870], L.R. 6 Q.B. 139.
(432)
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states not only by the common law, but also by the Constitution and
implementing federal legislation. The Constitution, article 4, § 1, reads
as follows:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts,4 Records,' and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.0
The statute7 does not enlarge on the constitutional provision nor furnish
any guides as to its interpretation, so most cases talk in terms of the
constitutional provision rather than the statute. Although the constitutional
provision does not refer to federal court judgments, it is well settled that
they are entitled to recognition under the same conditions as those rendered
by state courts.8 So too, a federal court must give full faith and credit
to a judgment rendered by any state court.9 Therefore, whenever a state
court is involved either as the state of rendition or the state in which
recognition is sought, full faith and credit is applicable, even though the
other court may be a federal one. Where both the court of rendition and
the court where recognition is sought are federal courts, it was thought
at least in the pre-Erie 10 -days that full faith and credit was not applicable
and that recognition depended upon principles of res judicata." However,
by statute'2 congress has not only provided that judgments rendered by
one federal court must be recognized by another, but has gone further
4. A separate body of constitutional law has grown up about the duty of a
state to enforce a statutory cause of action created by the law of a sister state.
See the discussion and a review of cases in Watson v. Employers Liability Assur-
ance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
5. Such as land titles issued by the situs.
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV., § 1.
7. 62 STAT. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1950). Such a statute was en-
acted by the First Congress in 1790.
8. Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900); Shay v. New
York Life Insurance Co., 354 Mo. 920, 192 S.W.2d 421 (1946); In re Thompson's
Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.2d 93 (1936); Stuart v. Dickinson, 290 Mo. 516, 235
S.W. 446 (En Banc 1921).
9. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932). See also the discus-
sion of full faith and credit as between federal and state courts in Supreme Lodge,
Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30 (1924).
10. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Recognition would now
be required by the Erie doctrine in any event.
11. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
12. 62 STAT. 958 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1950).
1963]
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and provided that a judgment rendered in one federal court shall be reg-
istrable in another federal court and have the same effect as if rendered
by the latter court, thus making it unnecessary for the plaintiff to insti-
tute an action on the judgment.
It should be emphasized that the full faith and credit clause only
prescribes minimum requirements. It is for the benefit of the party
seeking to enforce the judgment and not for the benefit of the party seek-
ing to resist enforcement. So long as the judgment is valid in the state
where rendered, the forum may recognize it, even though failure to do so
would not be a denial of full faith and credit. Thus, a defendant's claim
that the state violated his rights by recognizing a decree of a sister
state which it was not constitutionally required to do, raises no federal
question.1s In re Veac- 14 saw the Missouri court treat as conclusive a
judgment of a sister state, though its failure to do so would not have
violated the full faith and credit clause. An attorney, who was a member
of both the Illinois and Missouri bars, was found guilty of misconduct by
the Illinois court in a disciplinary proceeding. He practiced in Illinois, but
the misconduct constituted grounds for suspension in Missouri as well. In
a disciplinary proceeding in Missouri, the court refused to permit him to
relitigate the factual questions that were litigated in the Illinois action.
Although the court talked in terms of "full faith and credit" as to the
facts litigated in Illinois, it is clear that full faith and credit was not
required, since the Missouri officials were not parties to the Illinois action,
and technically the Illinois decision was not res judicata. However, the re-
spondent had the opportunity to litigate the question in Illinois and had
no right to raise it again in Missouri. Of course, Missouri would decide
what measures it wished to take and would not necessarily take the action
that Illinois did (i.e., it might suspend the attorney while Illinois would
disbar).
For purposes of analysis we will differentiate between a "true judg-
ment" and a "decree." A "true judgment" may be best defined as an
unconditional court order requiring the immediate payment of a sum
certain in money (e.g., an award of damages in the amount of $10,000). A
13. Roller v. Murray, 234 U.S. 738 (1914) (claim that the situs court recog-
nized as conclusive a decree of a sister state that passed title to situs land).
Where the court of rendition had judicial jurisdiction, a sister state may treat itsjudgment as conclusive. See particularly the discussion in Creager v. Superior
Court, 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P.2d 552 (1932).
14. 365 Mo. 776, 287 S.W.2d 753 (En Banc 1948).
[Vol. 28
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"decree" would be any other type of court order such as one requiring the
payment of alimony in installments, ordering specific performance, or
enjoining certain conduct. Since most decrees were historically administered
by separate "courts of equity,"' 5 and often involved the doing of an act
or refraining from action, their treatment necessarily differs from that of a
true judgment. However, merely because a court order takes the form
of a decree does not mean that it is not entitled to full faith and credit.
The vestige that "equity acts in personam" is not true insofar as it could
be interpreted to mean that a decree in an "equity action" merely binds
the defendant to the issuing court and is not entitled to extraterritorial
recognition.1" Decrees are entitled to full faith and credit, and where a
particular decree is not recognized, it must be for reasons other than the
fact that "equity acts in personam."
B. Process of Enforcement
A judgment rendered in F-I is not a judgment in F-2,17 except where
two federal courts are involved.8 A foreign judgment is not self-operating,
and thus an independent action must be brought on the judgment in F-2.19
Once the new judgment is issued by the F-2 court, it is enforceable in the
same manner as any F-2 judgment. Under the formulary system, an action
of debt on the judgment was employed, and the theory of the action
governs suits on foreign judgments today.
Missouri has adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Law,20 which provides summary procedure for the enforcement of judg-
15. Though courts still use the term, it is misleading, since in all but four
states separate courts have been abolished. There should be no distinction be-
tween law and equity except insofar as constitutionally necessary, e.g., the right
to trial by jury. I have discussed this subject elsewhere. See Sedler, Conditional,
Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 RUT. L. REv. 639, 712 (1962); Sedler,
Equitable Relief, But Not Equity, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 293 (1963).
16. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910), where the Supreme Court held
that an "equity" decree for alimony was entitled to full faith and credit without
any discussion of this point.
17. We will use F-1 to refer to the state of rendition and F-2 to refer to the
state where recognition is sought. Any third state will be referred to as F-3.
18. See the discussion, supra, note 12 and accompanying text.
19. Barney v. White, 46 Mo. 137 (1870). See Cook's Estate v. Brown, 346
Mo. 281, 140 S.W.2d 42 (1940), where this point was relied on to hold that Mis-
souri could, consistent with full faith and credit, give domestic judgments pref-
erence for distribution purposes from the time of rendition while foreign judgments
were entitled to such status only from the time when enforcement was sought in
Missouri.
20. § 511.760, RSMo 1959.
1963]
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ments of sister states and federal courts. Note that it is not available
where the judgment of a foreign country is involved, but that a plaintiff
may in any case resort to the common law action instead of proceedings
under the statute. Upon application, the judgment creditor may have the
foreign judgment2l registered. The petition must set forth a copy of the
judgment, together with the date of entry and any subsequent entries.
It must be authenticated according to the federal statute.22 After registra-
tion the judgment creditor can have summons served on the judgment
debtor, assuming he is amenable to personal jurisdiction in Missouri. If
personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained, notice by registered mail is sent
to the last known address of the debtor. Whether or not personal jurisdic-
tion is obtained or the debtor comes in to defend, a levy may be made
under the registered judgment upon any property the debtor has in Mis-
souri. If the debtor comes in to defend, he may set up any defense that
is available against enforcement of a foreign judgment, and may also move
that the registration be set aside. If the registration is not set aside, it
becomes a final Missouri judgment thirty days after service or thirty-
five days after the mailing of notice.
Whether the debtor is served or appears is significant insofar as it
affects the kind of judgment the court enters. If he is before the court,
it can render a personal judgment for the full amount of the judgment
upon which suit is brought. However, if the debtor is not before the court,
it can only render a quasi in rem judgment for the value of the debtor's
property in Missouri.2 3 Once the property is sold to satisfy the F-1 judgment,
the Missouri judgment is spent, so to speak, and if the plaintiff seeks
recovery of the balance elsewhere, his suit must be upon the original
judgment.
There is some question with respect to authentication as to whether
the statute supersedes the prior Missouri law requiring proof of jurisdiction
in certain instances. Under prior law, where the F-1 court was a court of
21. This is limited to judgments of sister states, territories and the federal
courts. A judgment of a foreign nation, e.g., Canada, must be sued upon in a com-
mon law action sounding in debt on the judgment.
22. Missouri appears to have no other authentication statute and under the
act makes reference to the federal statute. See note 7, supra.
23. In a quasi in rem action the forum employs its power over property
situate there to adjudicate personal obligations. Recovery, of course, is limited to
the property, which can be sold to satisfy the claim. Examples of the exercise of
quasi in rem jurisdiction would include attachment and garnishment. If the owner




Sedler: Sedler: Recognition of Foreign Judgments and Decrees Symposium:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
general jurisdiction, its jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties
was presumed, and the introduction of a certified copy of the judgment
made out a prima facie case.2 4 But if it was not a court of general jurisdic-
tion, such as a justice of the peace court, the burden was on the judgment
plaintiff to show that the court had subject matter jurisdiction.2 5 The
plaintiff would have to introduce the statute of F-1 giving the justice of
the peace jurisdiction over that type of case. So too, where the judgment
was entered by the clerk of court rather than the judge, while the court
was in vacation, the statutory authority of the clerk so to act had to be
shown.26 The theory was that such a practice was unknown to the common
law, and therefore the presumption of jurisdiction did not attach. It is
not clear whether this is changed by the Uniform Act. The federal statute,
to which the act refers for authentication, says that there must be a
certificate by the judge that the attestation is in proper form. There appears
to be no Missouri statute on the subject. Still, the federal statute talks in
terms of attestation, rather than the showing of authority. If a judgment
was entered by the clerk, but the judge gives the certificate, then this
should be conclusive proof of the clerk's authority to issue the judgment.
As to the subject matter jurisdiction of a court not of general juris-
diction, it is submitted that the Uniform Act changes the prior law. Since
its purpose is to provide summary proceedings for enforcement, while
giving the defendant an opportunity to raise all defenses, the burden
should be on the defendant to show the lack of jurisdiction of the F-1
court. Should the question arise again, it is likely that the courts will
hold that the statute supersedes the prior requirements.
There is also some confusion as to question of specificity. In the
old case of Lackland v. Pritchett,27 it was held that a judgment for a
sum and "costs" would not be recognized as to the costs, and that the
plaintiff could not show what the costs were. A later court of appeals case,
Ka n v. Mercantile Town Mut. Ins. Co.,2 s permitted the plaintiff to
introduce proof of the costs and also computed legal interest according
to the rate in F-1. As to interest, it is expressly authorized by § 14 of the
24. Toley v. Coover, 335 Mo. 113, 71 S.W.2d 1067 (1934).
25. Central State Bank v. Moody, 225 Mo. App. 446, 40 S.W.2d 760 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1931); Groo v. Sanderson, 208 Mo. App. 623, 235 S.W. 177 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1921).
26. Schroeder v. Edwards, 267 Mo. 459, 184 S.W. 108 (1916); Groo v.
Sanderson, supra, note 25.
27. 12 Mo. 484 (1849).
28. 150 Mo. App. 393, 130 S.W. 492 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910).
1963 ]
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act that the court is to award interest in accordance with the F-1 rate and
such costs as are incidental to the proceedings in Missouri. On the ques-
tion of extrinsic proof of costs, the statute is silent. The reasoning in
the Kahn case, to the effect that to deny proof of costs is to deny the
plaintiff the full amount he was to recover, is quite sound; and if the
question were to arise today, the case would probably be followed.
An F-1 judgment is considered valid until reversed on appeal, even
though an appeal may have been taken.20 The defendant bears the burden
of showing that the judgment was reversed at the time enforcement is
sought.30 However, a problem arises if an appeal is pending in F-1 at the
time that enforcement is sought in F-2. At common law, an appeal did not
vacate the judgment, but in many states by statute an appeal does
vacate it, at least insofar as enforcement is concerned. If an appeal vacates
its enforcement, then enforcement can not be ordered in a sister state
until the appeal is decided. Most states will stay enforcement in any event
until the appeal is decided in F-1." The Uniform Act directs the court to
postpone the trial until the appeal is concluded. It also authorizes the
court to set aside the levy, if the defendant furnishes adequate security
for satisfaction of the judgment.
The Uniform Act provides a summary remedy for enforcement of a
foreign judgment, while giving the defendant the opportunity to assert
all defenses available to him in the traditional action on the judgment.
II. PRINCIPLES OF RECOGNITION
The full faith and credit clause requires a valid judgment of a sister
state to be recognized without regard to the nature of the underlying
claim or to anything that transpired in the courts of F-1. This is most
clearly demonstrated in Faunterloy v. L m.32 Mississippi law prohibited
certain forms of future contracts. Such a contract was made in Mississippi
between residents of that state, to be performed there. Upon breach it
was submitted to arbitration. The party, in whose favor the award had
been made, brought suit in Mississippi, which he dismissed when the
defendant raised the issue of illegality. He subsequently caugkt the defend-
29. McCune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 306, 102 S.W. 997 (1907): See RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 435, comment c. (1934).
30. McCune v. Goodwillie, supra, note 29.
31. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAws §§ 435, 438 (1934).
32. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
[Vol. 28
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ant in Missouri and served him there. The Missouri court, clearly misapply-
ing Mississippi law, which it construed as not prohibiting civil recovery
on such a contract, rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued
on the judgment in Mississippi, but was denied enforcement on the ground
that Missouri had misapplied Mississippi law. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that Mississippi denied full faith and credit to the
Missouri judgment.33 The issue had been determined by the Missouri court,
which had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Full faith
and credit was intended to prohibit the re-examination of determinations
on the merits when recognition of the judgment was sought in another
state. Jurisdiction to decide a case is jurisdiction to decide erroneously as
well as correctly. As the Court observed:
We feel no apprehensions that painful or humiliating conse-
quences will follow upon our decision. No court would give judg-
ment for a plaintiff unless it believed that the facts were a cause
of action by the law determining their effect. Mistakes will be rare.
In this case the Missouri court no doubt supposed that the award
was binding by the law of Mississippi. If it was mistaken it made
a natural mistake. The validity of its judgment, even in Mississippi,
is, as we believe, the result of the Constitution as it always has been
understood, and is not a matter to arouse the susceptibilities of the
States, all of which are equally concerned in the question and
equally on both sides.34
The Missouri courts have consistently held that mistakes of law or other
irregularities committed by the F-1 court do not prevent recognition in the
F-2 state.3 5 Thus, in Abernatky v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.,6 a judgment
rendered in an action involving a minor was a bar to another suit in F-2,
even though the original action was a "friendly suit" and there were ir-
regularities in the administration of the judgment awarded to the minor.
Nor can recognition be refused on the ground that F-2 does not consider
the judgment plaintiff the real party in interest to enforce the substantive
claim, so long as he was the real party in interest under the law of F-1.81
The nature of the underlying transaction has been involved in a
33. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 446, illustration 1 (1934).
34. 210 U.S. at 237-238.
35. See, e.g., Freedy v. Trimble-Compton Produce Co., 329 Mo. 879, 46 S.W.2d
822 (1931), and the discussion therein. See also the discussion in United States
ex rel. First National Bank v. Lucy, 316 Mo. 812, 49 S.W.2d 8 (1932).
36. 287 Mo. 30, 228 S.W. 486 (1920).
37. Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939).
19631
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number of cases and with one exception that may not now be valid, it has
been held to be irrelevant. In Keney, Adm'r v. Supreme Lodge,38 Illinois
was required to enforce a judgment of a sister state, even though it would
not have entertained a claim on the original cause of action. It had denied
its courts jurisdiction to enforce claims under foreign wrongful death acts
and judgments rendered pursuant to such claims. At that time it was
assumed that full faith and credit did not require Illinois to entertain an
action on the statutory claim, though now it is settled that it must do
so.31 The Supreme Court held that a judgment could not be refused
full faith and credit on the ground that F-2 would not entertain a suit
on the underlying claim. Since the claim had been reduced to judgment
in a sister state, the underlying basis was irrelevant. Nor could Illinois
achieve this result by denying its courts jurisdiction. Its courts were per-
fectly capable of enforcing judgments, and the purpose of the full faith
and credit clause could not be thwarted by transparent devices.40
In Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,41 the Supreme Court
held that a judgment for taxes rendered by a court of a sister state was
entitled to full faith and credit. It was traditionally thought that a state
was not required to "enforce the penal or revenue laws of another state. ''42
Even assuming that full faith and credit does not require a state to entertain
a suit for taxes by a sister state, 43 a judgment stands on a different foot-
38. 252 U.S. 411 (1920).
39. First Nat. Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
40. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), involving state enforcement in its
courts of a federal claim.
41. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
42. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 443 (1934). The rule was stated.
as follows:
"A valid foreign judgment for the payment of money which has been
obtained in favor of a state, a state agency, or a private person, on a cause
of action created by the law of the foreign state as a method of furthering
its own governmental interests will not be enforced."
Comment b. observed that enforcement was not required by the full faith and
credit clause.
In the 1948 Supplement the section was amended to read as follows:
"A valid foreign judgment for the payment of money which has been
obtained in favor of a state, a state agency, or a private person, on a cause
of action created by the law of a foreign state as a method of furthering
its own governmental interests will be enforced unless it is deemed to be a
penalty."
43. The point has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court. Such a suit has
been entertained in Missouri. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers,
238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (St. L. Ct. App. 1946). See the discussion,
infra, note 53 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 28
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ing. The forum is not asked to litigate the merits of the case, nor to
construe the revenue laws of another state. There is no danger of its mis-
construing those laws or interfering with that state's revenue policy. These
matters have been adjudicated in F-1. F-2 is simply asked to enforce a
judgment for the payment of money. The Supreme Court observed as
follows:
In numerous cases this court has held that credit must be
given to the judgment of another state, although the forum would
not be required to entertain the suit on which the judgment was
founded; that consideration of policy of the forum which would
defeat a suit upon the original cause of action are not involved
in a suit upon the judgment and are insufficient to defeat it. Full
faith and credit is required to be given to the judgment of another
state, although the original suit on which it was based arose in
the state of the forum and was barred there by the Statute of
Limitations when the judgment was rendered, and where the orig-
inal suit was upon a gambling contract invalid by the law of the
forum where it was made. It was required where the judgment
was for wrongful death, although it was thought that the statute
giving recovery was not entitled to full faith and credit. (citations
omitted)-
As to judgments that are "penal," the requirements of full faith and
credit are not so clear, though there is no good reason why a "penal" judg-
ment should not be entitled to the same recognition. By "penal" we
mean a judgment by which the state and not an injured individual re-
ceives recovery. Clearly a judgment is entitled to recognition when an
individual plaintiff receives the recovery, even though the substantive
basis of liability may be punitive. In Huntington v. Attrill, 45 the plaintiff
recovered a judgment under a New York statute making a director who
issued a false certificate as to corporate capitalization liable to creditors.
When Maryland refused to enforce the judgment on the ground that it
was "penal," the Supreme Court reversed. Conceding that "the courts of
no country execute the penal laws of another," the court defined "penal"
in the conflicts sense as "designed to redress a wrong to the public rather
than to a private person." Since recovery would go to the individual
plaintiff, it was immaterial that the wrong of the defendant bore no re-
lationship to the harm suffered or that the statute was designed to insure
44. 296 U.S. at 277.
45. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
1963 ]
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proper certification. As long as recovery is given to the individual plain-
tiff, the purpose of F-1 in imposing liability or the method by which
liability is ascertained has no effect on the duty of F-2 to give full faith
and credit to the judgment.4
Where the requirements of full faith and credit are not entirely clear
is where the state is the plaintiff and has recovered a judgment for a
penalty in its courts. In Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co.,47 Wisconsin
sued in the Supreme Court to enforce a judgment rendered by its courts
against a foreign corporation that had failed to file business statements
as required by Wisconsin statute. The statute imposed a penalty for such
non-compliance, which the state recovered. The court found that it had
original jurisdiction in a suit brought by a state against a citizen of
another state, which would include a foreign corporation. However, the
court also found that the grant of original jurisdiction in Article III did
not authorize it to hear cases that would not be heard in a state court,
the purpose in vesting such jurisdiction being to avoid partiality in favor
of the citizen in his home state.48 Since no state was required to enforce
the "penal laws" of another, a state court would not entertain the suit,
and the Supreme Court would not do so either. The court expressly held
that the full faith and credit clause did not abrogate the common law
rule. This was because the clause was considered as but a "rule of evidence."
The following language which was expressly repudiated by the court in
the White case demonstrates the court's rationale in Pelican.:
The essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action
are not changed by recovering judgment upon it; and the technical
rules, which regard the original claim as merged in the judgment,
and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay
it, do not preclude a court, to which a judgment is presented for
affirmative action (while it cannot go behind the judgment for the
purpose of examining into the validity of the claim), from ascer-
taining whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the
court is authorized to enforce it.49
46. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 444 (1934), illustration 1. See
also the discussion in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918)
as to enforcement of "penal claims."
47. 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
48. The same purpose that the Court has recognized as the basis of conferring
diversity jurisdiction on the lower federal courts, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 111-12 (1945).
49. 127 U.S. at 292, 93, The Court in White held that insofar as Pelican sug.
gested that full faith and credit was not required unless the original cause of action
[Vol. 28
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The Restatemet now caveats the question as to whether full faith
and credit requires recognition of a judgment founded upon a pen-
alty in the conflicts sense, as defined in Huntington v. Attr. ° In the
White case the Supreme Court expressly left the question open:
We intimate no opinion whether a suit upon a judgment for
an obligation created by a penal law, in the international sense,
see Huntington v. Attrill, supra, is within the jurisdiction of the
federal District Courts, or whether full faith and credit must be
given to such a judgment even though a suit for the penalty
before reduced to judgment could not be maintained outside of
the state where imposed. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co.,
sitpra.5
It is submitted, however, that no valid distinction can be drawn be-
tween a judgment for taxes and a judgment for a penalty, even though
the court in White emphasized that a judgment for taxes was not penal.
In both instances F-2 is merely being asked to enforce a judgment for
money. A judgment for a penalty is considered a civil rather than a
criminal judgment under the laws of most states.52 The underlying nature
of the claim is of no concern to F-2. In any event, I believe that Mis-
souri would extend recognition to such a judgment, assuming that the
holding of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in State ex. rel. Oklahoauz Tax
Commission v. Rodgers,5" would be adopted by our supreme court, as I
think it would be. There, Missouri entertained an original suit to recover
taxes brought by a sister state. While the court, as did the Supreme Court
in White, distinguished between penal and revenue laws, it nonetheless
emphasized that there was no interference with the policy of F-1 by
enforcing a money judgment, irrespective of the underlying nature of
the obligation. It found that there was no inconvenience to the defendant,
nor any burden upon Missouri courts. It emphasized that often a suit
elsewhere was the only way a state could obtain a satisfaction of an ob-
ligation owed to it. It stressed the need for cooperation between sister
states. Since a state may recognize the judgment of a sister state, though
was entitled to like credit it was inconsistent with other decisions of the Court.
296 U.S. at 278.
50. RESTATEMENT, CoNFicr OF LAws § 443 (1948 Supp.).
51. 296 U.S. at 279.
52. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. DeLassus, 205 Mo. 576, 104 S.W. 12 (1907).
53. 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (St. L. Ct. App. 1946).
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not constitutionally required to do so, 54 it is likely that Missouri would
enforce judgments of sister states, even though penal in the conflicts sense.
With the possible exception of judgments based on suits by states for
penalties, it is clear that the full faith and credit clause precludes any
examination into the underlying basis of a judgment rendered by a sister
state. Since Missouri is not likely to recognize even that exception, attacks
on sister state judgments in Missouri will have to be founded on some
other ground than the nature of the underlying transaction or events that
occurred in the rendition of the judgment in a sister state.
III. NoN-RECOGNrrON
A. Nature of the J zdgment
The judgment is entitled to full faith and credit only if it is a deter-
mination of the merits of the controversy. In Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co.,"5 a non-suit was entered in F-1. Under the law of F-1 a
judgment of non-suit did not bar another action. Since a judgment is not
entitled to any greater effect in F-2 than it has in F-i, another suit could
be maintained in F-2. In the course of its opinion the Missouri Supreme
Court enumerated the circumstances where the F-1 judgment would not
be on the merits. If the F-1 court dismissed for want of jurisdiction, either
to hear the case or to grant the relief sought, this would not be a merits
determination."0 Other situations would be where the plaintiff misconceived
his action or had joined improper parties or claims; where the complaint
was dismissed for failing to state a cause of action and the complaint in
the F-2 suit sets forth a cause of action in proper form; where the first
suit was improperly brought; and where the subject matter of the F-1
suit was inadmissible under the pleadings. Also, the F-I suit would not be
on the merits where the action was barred by a statute of limitations or
statute of frauds of F-1 construed as procedural.5 These situations are not
difficult to ascertain, and dismissal in F-1 on a non-merits determination
creates no problems.
54. See the discussion, supra, notes 13 and 14 and accompanying text.
55. 300 Mo. 1, 254 S.W. 266 (1923).
96. See Glencove Granite Co. v. City Trust, S.D.&S. Co., 118 Fed. 386 (3d
Cir. 1918), involving dismissal of a suit brought by a foreign corporation, which
had not complied with the registration statute.
57. As to the significance of such determinations for conflicts purposes see
Sedler, Thle Erie Outconm Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Con-
flict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 813, 846, 851 (1962). :
[Vol. 28
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Secondly, the judgment must be certain and unconditional. Where it
is subject to a condition not yet performed,5s or the amount is uncertain, 9
it will not be enforced in F-2. But even though it is originally conditional,
if, at the time of suit in F-2, the condition has been satisfied or is impos-
sible of performance, the judgment can be enforced. In Smitk v. Kander,60
the F-1 judgment in a replevin action provided for return of the chattel
or its value, which was assessed at a definite sum. No time limit was set
for return. At the time of suit in Missouri ten years had elapsed. The court
construed the Wisconsin statute as giving the defendant a reasonable time
to return the chattel. Since that time had elapsed, the judgment for the
money had now become final and could be enforced. The court said that
there was now a conclusive presumption-hence a rule of law-that the
chattel could not be returned.61
In any event, I cannot see why the F-2 court could not enforce the
judgment as rendered by the F-1 court, irrespective of passage of time.
The F-2 court can order return of the chattel within a specified time, and
if it is not returned, enforce the money portion of the judgment.
B. Lack of Jurisdiction
In this section we will deal with the ground most often asserted to
prevent recognition of a foreign judgment. The lack of jurisdiction can
be predicated upon a number of grounds. The first is that F-1 constitutionally
lacked judicial jurisdiction to render the judgment because of insufficient
contacts with the person, transaction, or thing. In the conflicts sense,
jurisdiction involves the power of F-1 to render a judgment that will be
recognized in F-2.6' A judgment may be valid where rendered, but the
contacts may not be sufficient to justify its recognition by another state.
Consider a case such as Buchanan v. Rucker,63 wherein the plaintiff sued
58. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 437 (1934).
59. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 436 (1934). See Central Pennsylvania
Conference v. LaRue, 164 Mo.App. 93, 148 S.W. 152 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912), holding
as uncertain a judgment entered by confession, which recited that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a specified amount, but which authorized forgiveness under cer-
tain circumstances.
60. 58 Mo. App. 61 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894).
61. See also National Surety Co. v. Austin Machinery Corp., 35 F.2d 842
* (6th Cir. 1929), where the same approach was taken when return of the chattel
had become impossible.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICT OF LAWS Tentative Draft § 42(1956).
63.. [1880] K.B. 9 East. 192.
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on a judgment of the Island Court of Tobago. There, jurisdiction was
authorized against any person upon any claim merely by the filing of
the complaint on the courthouse door. The defendant had never been on
the island. The English court, of course, refused to recognize the judg-
ment, since the defendant had not been served there. Lord Ellenborough,
while conceding that the judgment could be valid where rendered, asked,
"Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole
world," and concluded that it could not.64 In the conflicts sense then, a
judgment may be valid where rendered, but not entitled to recognition in
F-2 because of the lack of contacts sufficient to give F-1 judicial jurisdiction.
Such a situation is not possible as between states of the union. A
judgment rendered without sufficient contacts to give the state of rendition
judicial jurisdiction, within the meaning of the due process clause, is void
where rendered and cannot be recognized by a sister state, since such rec-
ognition would in turn violate the due process clause.6' On the other hand,
where the contacts are sufficient to give F-1 jurisdiction, full faith and
credit requires F-2 to recognize the judgment, even though F-2 would
not take jurisdiction if the suit were originally brought in F-2. This proposi-
tion is best demonstrated in Missouri by our court's treatment of judg-
ments rendered by confession. Missouri does not recognize common law
confession of judgments,c and the Missouri courts will not issue a judgment
upon confession unless there has been strict compliance with the statutory
procedure.67 But since jurisdiction can be obtained by consent consistent
with due process,68 it was early held that a judgment entered by confession
in a sister state must be afforded recognition in Missouri.6 9
64. See also Schibsby v. Westenholz [1870] L.R. 6 Q.B. 155., where England
refused to recognize a French decree on grounds of lack of jurisdiction in the con-
flicts sense, even though England would have taken jurisdiction based on the same
contacts.
65. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 417 (1877). Cf. Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N.Y.
149, 103 N.E. 1113 (1913). The coextensive nature of due process and full faith
and credit is not entirely clear in regard to divorce decrees rendered by a state
other than the state of matrimonial domicile. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226 (1945); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). Although a discus-
sion of divorce and other decrees in actions involving family law is not included in
this article because discussed elsewhere, it is submitted that due process and full
faith and credit will be held to be co-extensive in this area as well.
66. First Nat. Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909).
67. §§ 511.070-511.100, RSMo 1959.
68. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890);
Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). A very good
discussion of consent in the area of confessed judgments will be found in Hazel v.
Jacobs, 78 N.J.L. 459, 75 Atl. 903 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
69. Randolph v. Keiler, 21 Mo. 557 (1855). The later case, which is most
[Vol. 28
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This writing will not explore all the ramifications of the constitutional
bases of jurisdiction. Basically, however, they are (1) personal service
within the state,7 0 (2) domicile, 71 (3) consent,72 (4) in -rem, based on a
state's power over property situated there7 3 (5) minimal contacts with
the forum in the case of a foreign corporation'4 and (6) the doing of an
act within the forum out of which the plaintiff's cause of action arises.75
As long as the F-1 judgment can be supported upon one of these bases, full
faith and credit is required, even though such contact is not sufficient to
support judicial jurisdiction in F-2. In addition to judgments by confession,
judgments based on appearance and default,76 holding a position of trust
pursuant to order of the F-1 court,7 7 and garnishment of a debt by personal
service on the garnishee 7 s have been held entitled to recognition.
By the same token, however, F-2 may inquire into lack of jurisdiction,
since if it enforced a judgment rendered without sufficient contacts to give
F-1 jurisdiction, F-2 would be denying the defendant due process. There-
fore, it is not necessary for the defendant to have the judgment set aside
often cited to sustain this position is Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 544, 63 S.W. 489 (En
Banc 1901).
70. Pennoyer v. Neff, sv-pra note 65.
71. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). See, however, McDonald v. Ma-
bee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917), where the exercise of judicial jurisdiction over a domicil-
iary who had left the state without intention to return was held to be void, since
service was only -by publication. This was held to be inadequate notice. As to the
power of the domicile to bind its domiciliaries extraterritorially see, Skirotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
72. Cases cited note 68 supra.
73. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
74. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) as to jurisdiction of causes of action
arising outside of the forum.
75. Hess v. Pawloski 274 U.S. 352 (1927). For the modem view as to the
extent of such jurisdiction see Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
76. Gibson v. Epps, 352 S.W.2d 45 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961). See also, Adam v.
Saenger, supra note 68.
77. Shearer v. Parker, 364 Mo. 723, 267 S.W.2d 18 (1954). The defendant
was a Colorado administrator who had absconded with the assets. The Colorado
court rendered a judgment against him for the value of the assets for which he had
not accounted. See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913), which is the
Supreme Court holding that the result is constitutionally required and upon which
the court in Shearer relied.
78. Western Assurance Co. v. Walden, 238 Mo. 49, 141 S.W. 595 (1911). See
also Harris v. Balk, supra note 73. In order for the judgment to be entitled to full
faith and credit in the suit by the principal debtor against the garnishee the gar-
nishee must have originally given him notice of the garnishment proceedings. Other-
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by the F-1 court, but he may collaterally attack the judgment in F-2 when
enforcement is sought there.79 A number of cases have found the court
refusing to enforce judgments of sister states on the ground that there was
no constitutional basis of jurisdiction."0 In some cases the Missouri .court
has found that the defendant was not personally served in F-i; the court
will inquire into whether service was actually made, and a recital of service
is not conclusive.8' The most common ground of attack is where jurisdiction
is ostensibly based on consent, but the defendant did not, in fact, consent.
Some cases have involved unauthorized appearances by attorneys. An old
case held that a recital of appearance was conclusive, and the defendant
could not show that the appearance was unauthorized82 This position was
shortly repudiated, and the defendant was permitted to show that the
attorney was not authorized to appear for him. 3 Since he did not consent
to the jurisdiction by having an attorney appear for him and since he
was not personally served, there is no constitutional basis of jurisdiction,
and judgment is void both in F-1 and F-2. Stuart v. Dickinson,"4 provides
a good example of such a situation. The plaintiff brought suit against a
railroad in Missouri; the railroad defended on the ground that the plaintiff
had previously filed the same claim against it in receivership proceedings,
which was disallowed. The plaintiff was permitted to show that at the
time of the former proceedings he was incompetent and that the attorney
who filed the suit was engaged by the plaintiff's wife, who had no authority
to act for him. There was sufficient evidence to take this contention to
the jury, which found in the plaintiff's favor. Since the appearance by the
attorney was not authorized, the plaintiff was not bound by the earlier
judgment.
The issue of consent becomes very relevant when suit is on a confessed
79. See the discussion of this point in Stuart v. Dickinson, 209 Mo. 516, 547,
235 S.W. 446, 455 (En Banc 1921).
80. It should be noted that the forum employs its own conception of jurisdic-
tion subject to the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFLIct OF LAWS, Tentative Draft § 43 (1956).
81. Marx v. Fore, 51 Mo. 69 (1872); Winston v. Taylor, 28 Mo. 82 (1859);
Gillet v. Camp, 23 Mo. 375 (1856). But a return of the writ of summons marked
"returned in full" creates a prima facie case of service. Blackburn v. Jackson 26
Mo. 308 (1858).
82. Baker v. Stonebreaker, 34 Mo. 172 (1863).
83. Marx v. Fore, supra note 81. See also Topalian Bros. v. Asadorian, 104
S.W.2d 713 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937). In Napton v. Leaton, 71 Mo. 358 (1879), a
party who was not represented -by a guardian in probate proceedings was held
entitled to attack then insofar as they affected her rights in Missouri land.
84. Supra note 79.
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judgment. Since the court in F-1 had jurisdiction based on the consent
that the defendant gave the plaintiff rather than the consent he gave the
court, if there has been any departure from the consent contained in the
instrument, the plaintiff had no authority to confess the judgment, and
hence the F-1 court had no power to grant it. Not only is consent the basis
of jurisdiction, but in a confession of judgment situation the defendant also
waives the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard8 5 As a result
the Supreme Court has held that the consent must be strictly construed
and the Missouri courts, in view of their policy against confession, have
been only too happy to oblige.
In Grover & Baker Serving Machine Co. v. Radcliffe,s6 the instrument
authorized any attorney of any court of record to confess judgment. The
plaintiff had judgment confessed in Pennsylvania by the prothonotary
(clerk of court), which was authorized in Pennsylvania. The United States
Supreme Court held that the judgment was void, saying that the defend-
ant did not consent to be bound by the law of the state where judgment
was confessed, but only by the instrument. He had the right to "insist
upon the letter of the authority conferred." In National Exchange Bank of
Tiffin v. Wiley,87 the instrument autohrized confession of judgment in favor
of the payee. The Supreme Court held that it did not authorize confession
by a holder to whom the instrument was negotiated by the payee, and a
judgment confessed by such a holder was deemed void. 8
The Missouri courts have been perhaps more stringent with respect to
the plaintiff. In Bonnet-Brown Sales Service v. Utt,s 9 our supreme court
said that a power of attorney is to be construed with "minute strictness."
This instrument authorized any attorney of record to appear and confess
judgment on behalf of the maker. The court said that the judgment did
not indicate whether the attorney who confessed judgment was represent-
ing the maker or the plaintiff. Therefore, it did not appear that there was
compliance with the consent given. In Hester v. Frank,90 a judgment ob-
tained by confession was found to be void on the ground that the warrant
of attorney did not survive payment by some of the co-makers; nor did
85. See the discussion of this point in Hazel v. Jacobs, supra note 68.
86. 137 U.S. 287 (1890).
87. 195 U.S. 257 (1904).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Tentative Draft § 81,
illustration 1 (1956).
89. 323 Mo. 589, 19 S.W.2d 888 (1929).
90. 189 Mo. App. 40, 176 S.W. 481 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
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it authorize assignment by the payee to an attorney to confess judgment
against the remaining maker. However, some construction may be permis-
sible. In Irwin v. Rawling,0 ' it was held that where the warrant of attorney
contained in a joint and several note authorized confession of judgment
against "the undersigned," the warrant was construable as authorizing con-
fession against any one of the parties, so that the death of one of the
parties did not revoke the authority to confess judgment against the others.
The result is proper, since the note itself was a joint and several note, and
the authority could really be open to only one construction. This represents
the limit of tolerable construction, and any greater ambiguity will prevent
recognition in Missouri. Whether the United States Supreme Court would
hold that Missouri is acting properly in such a strict construction may be
open to question, but it is submitted that the language and rationale in
the Grover case support Missouri's position.
Jurisdiction may also be in issue where the party is allegedly bound by
representative proceedings.02 In Freedy v. Trimble-Compton Produce Co.,93
suit was brought upon an assessment decree rendered against members of
a mutual insurance company. The defendant was permitted to show that
he was not a member at the time the proceedings were instituted and thus
could not be bound by the judgment against the insurer.94 Since notice
and an opportunity to be heard are requirements of due process, a judgment
may be collaterally attacked on that ground, even though jurisdiction was
present.0 5 Finally, even though the exercise of jurisdiction might be con-
stitutional, if it was not authorized by the state of rendition the judgment
91. 141 S.W.2d 223 (K.C. Mo. App. 1940).
92. The most common situation is where he is a member of a class whose
rights or liabilities have been adjudicated in a valid class action. In such a situation
F-2 must give conclusive effect to the class action in F-1. Barber v. Hartford Life
Insurance Co., 245 U.S. 146 (1917), reversing 269 Mo. 21, 187 S.W. 867 (1916).
There a party suing on a life insurance policy was held to be concluded by a finding
in a Connecticut class action that the policy was forfeited for failure to pay certain
valid assessment. Missouri was precluded from relitigating the issue of validity.
Interestingly enough, on remand, Missouri found that the assessment was void for
another reason, which issue was not adjudicated in the Connecticut action. 279 Mo.
316, 214 S.W. 207 (1921). The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the
issue was not litigated in Connecticut, which enabled Missouri to litigate it here.
Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Barber, 255 U.S. 129 (1921). See also Sovereign
Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Achlenberg v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 346
Mo. 927, 144 S.W.2d 73 (1940); Rechow v. Bankers Life Co., 335 Mo. 668, 73
S.W.2d 794 (1934).
93. 329 Mo. 879, 46 S.W.2d 822 (1931).
94. To the same effect is State ex rel. Wallace v. Summers, 222 Mo. App. 782,
9 S.W.2d 867 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
95. Napton v. Leaton, 71 Mo. 358 (1879); Sallee v. Hays, 3 Mo. 116 (1832).
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is not entitled to full faith and credit, since a judgment is not entitled to
greater weight in F-2 than it has in F-1. In Wignet v. Woods, 0 the Cali-
fornia lower court modified the judgment after it became final, which the
Missouri court found could not be done under California law. Since the
judgment was not valid in California, it would not be recognized in Missouri.
The lack of subject matter jurisdiction can also be raised collaterally.
It may be predicated upon constitutional infirmity such as the exercise of
jurisdiction over land not under state control, 97 or the exercise of in rem
jurisdiction over property not within its boundaries," or it may be that
the particular court lacked jurisdiction under F-1 law. In Tkompson v.
Whitman,99 an action was brought in New York to recover a boat that had
been ordered seized in New Jersey pursuant to statute prohibiting its use
for unlawful purposes, and a judgment was rendered in a justice's court.
Under New Jersey law that court had jurisdiction only if the boat was
used for the illegal purpose in a particular county and the seizure took
place there. The New York court found that the defendant was not en-
gaged in the proscribed activity and that the seizure did not occur in the
required county. Therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the judgment, being void where rendered, was not en-
titled to full faith and credit. The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the F-2 state can independently determine the jurisdictional
facts upon which the F-1 judgment was based.100
The jurisdiction of a federal court may also be questioned under the
same circumstances as that of a sister state.10 However, a question arises
as to challenges to federal jurisdiction as opposed to jurisdiction over the
person or subject matter. In Wonderly v. Lafayette Cou-nty, 02 when plaintiff
brought action to enforce a federal judgment, the defendant sought to
enjoin enforcement, by way of counterclaim, on the ground that the judg-
ment had been obtained by a fraudulent assignment in violation of the
96. 294 S.W.2d 431 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
97. Hickey's Lessee v. Stewart, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 750 (1845).
98. Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962). See also Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958), involving an attack on a Florida decree purporting to deter-
mine the validity of a trust where the assets and the trustee were in Delaware.
99. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
100. See also RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 429(d), 432, illustration 1(1934).
101. Stuart v. Dickinson, 290 Mo. 446, 235 S.W. 446 (En Banc 1921).
102. 150 Mo. 635, 51. S.W. 745 (1899).
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assignee clause.10 3 The trial court granted the injunction and the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed, saying that it was not permitting a collateral
attack but merely acting on the defendant's "person." This is but a semantic
difference, since the effect is still to refuse enforcement of the federal
judgment. In National Surety Co. v. Casner,104 the court said in dictum
that it could not permit a collateral attack on a federal court judgment on
ground of improper removal. The case on which it relied, however, Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McCabe,105 involved the state court from which
the case had been removed and not a state court asked to enforce a federal
judgment. There the state court found that removal was improper, which
was clearly not a function of the state court. The situation is different
where a judgment of a federal court, sued upon in a state, is challenged
for want of jurisdiction. But the court in Casner, it is submitted, was correct,
and the reasoning is equally applicable to fraudulent assignment or any
other challenges to federal jurisdiction. Directly in point are two United
State Supreme Court cases, Dowell v. Applegate,' 6 and Des Moines Naviga-
tion Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co.,107 which held that an unreversed judgment
of a federal court was a bar to another action in a state court, even though
federal jurisdiction was lacking, and that the state had to give full faith
and credit to the prior federal decree. The court in Wonderly recognized the
authority of these cases, but held that collateral attack was not being
permitted. It said that this was a fraud on the federal court and the
defendant, who was "tricked out of asserting his defense." But as later
cases will indicate, "fraud" as a defense is limited to the fraudulent ob-
taining of jurisdiction over the defendant's person, which was not involved
here. Here the fraud only related to the matter of assignment and if the
federal court did not discover it, the decision is no more erroneous than in
the cases of improper removal. The defendant had his opportunity to raise
the question before the federal court. The position of the Supreme Court
is clear. Improper federal jurisdiction is a question only for the federal
103. 18 STAT. 470, 472 (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1) (1940). This provided that
suit in a federal court by an assignee could not be maintained unless it could be
maintained by the assignor, e.g., both the assignor and the assignee had to be
diverse to the defendant. The 1948 Revision eliminated this provision and provides
that jurisdiction shall exist unless the assignment was collusively made. 62 STAT.
935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1950).
104. 253 S.W.2d 1057 (Mo. 1923).
105. 213 U.S. 207 (1909).
106. 152 U.S. 327 (1894).
107. 123 U.S. 552 (1887).
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courts, and the state courts may not refuse to recognize unreversed judg-
ments of the federal courts, valid as regards jurisdiction over the defendant.
The statements in Casner indicate that Wondery would no longer be fol-
lowed insofar as to do so would deny enforcement of a federal court's
judgment, because of the absence of federal jurisdiction.
Thus far, in our discussion of lack of jurisdiction, we have assumed
that the defendant had standing to raise the question. As to personal
jurisdiction, he had standing only if he did not contest the question in F-1.
A party has no right to contest the question of jurisdiction more than
once, 08 and relitigation is prohibited by the full faith and credit clause.
In Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co.,09 a Missouri corporation was sued in New
York. It claimed that New York lacked jurisdiction over it, but the claim
was decided against it and there was no appeal. When sued on the judgment
in Missouri, it defended on the ground that the New York court lacked
jurisdiction. In an excellent and well-reasoned opinion, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that full faith and credit precluded Missouri from relitigating
the question of jurisdiction. It stated that a party can attack a judgment
of a sister state for want of personal jurisdiction only if he did not litigate
the question there. In later cases the United States Supreme Court took
the same position, and it is well-settled that an unfavorable decision as to
jurisdiction, even if not appealed, precludes relitigation in F-2."0
In Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore,"' the Kansas City Court of
Appeals did not permit a jurisdictional attack, even though the defendant
did not litigate the jurisdictional question in F-1. A minor resided with a
relative in Mississippi after his mother died. The defendant was his step-
108. See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890), upholding the Texas practice
barring special appearances. Any appearance is deemed a general appearance by
which the defendant subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court. It was held
that this procedure did not offend due process, since he need not appear and then
could contest the jurisdiction when enforcement is sought in F-2. He is not harmed
by the judgment until enforcement is sought. As long as he has one opportunity
to litigate the question, due process is satisfied, even though if he choses to litigatejurisdiction, he cannot litigate the merits (if F-2 finds Texas had jurisdiction, full
faith and credit precludes re-examination of the merits).
109. 316 Mo. 812, 293 S.W. 760 (1927).
110. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932). See also Treinies
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). Compare Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U.S. 522 (1931), where the principle of res judicata
prevented relitigation of the jurisdiction of one federal court when recognition was
sought in another. See also RESTATEMENT, CONFI.icr oF LAws § 451(1) (1950
Supp.).
111. 215 Mo. App. 21, 263 S.W. 530 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
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father, who claimed that the mother's domicile was Missouri, since the
defendant was domiciled there. He further alleged that upon the mother's
marriage the minor took his mother's domicile by operation of law. The
Mississippi court appointed a guardian; it did not appear that the defendant
was before the court. The guardian sued the defendant in Missouri to
require him to turn over property belonging to the minor. The court held
that the judgment of the Mississippi court could not be collaterally attacked.
While the result was not constitutionally required, since the defendant was
not before the Mississippi court, it is nonetheless sound. No "rights" of
the defendant were affected by the Mississippi decree, since he was merely
required to turn over property belonging to another, and a stepfather had
no right to be a guardian of the child.112 Mississippi was the state having
the real interest in the child's welfare, since that was where he was residing,
and the court rightfully refused to disturb its appointment.
As to subject matter jurisdiction the result is not so clear. When a party
litigates the question of personal jurisdiction, he is deemed to waive any
objections to such jurisdiction, even though, in fact, it may not exist. But
subject matter jurisdiction, unlike personal jurisdiction, cannot be waived.
Consequently, while the issue of personal jurisdiction cannot constitutionally
be relitigated, the full faith and credit clause does not prevent relitigation
of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the principle of res judicata may
be applicable. Since subject matter jurisdiction has been litigated in F-I,
the policy behind res judicata-that there be an end to litigation-comes
into play. Ordinarily a party who has had his day in court should not have
the opportunity again to question the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
But in some circumstances, the policy against permitting a court to act
on things beyond its power may outweigh the policy behind res judicata.
As the Restatement puts it:
Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines
that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot
collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the court did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, unless the policy
underlying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the policy
against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdiction.1" 8
112. Cf. May v. Anderson 345 U.S. 528 (1953), holding that F-l's determina-
tion that the mother is not entitled to custody is not binding on F-2 if the mother
was not present in F-1 even absent any change of circumstances.
113. RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcr oF LAWS § 451(2) (1950 Supp.). Among the
factors to be considered in determining that collateral attack should be permitted
it lists (1) the lack of jurisdiction was clear, (2) the issue depended on a question
[Vol. 28
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In the latter situation a party will not be precluded from relitigating subject
matter jurisdiction.
Such a case was Duke v. Durfee,114 involving title to several hundred
acres of land, once an island, in the Missouri River bottoms on the Missouri-
Nebraska border, the main channel of the river forming the boundary
between Missouri and Nebraska. The land was originally within the
boundaries of Nebraska, but it was alleged that because of shifts in the
main channel of the Missouri River, it was now within Missouri. The
plaintiff in the Missouri action claimed title through a patent issued to her
by Missouri officials. The defendant claimed title through a Nebraska tax
deed issued by Nebraska officials. The defendant had earlier instituted an
action to quiet title in which the plaintiff had appeared. Subject matter
jurisdiction in an action to quiet title exists, of course, only where the land
is situated in the forum. Here the determination of subject matter jurisdiction
and the merits were co-extensive. If the land was located in Nebraska,
the court had subject matter jurisdiction, and the Nebraska title was valid
and the Missouri one void, since Missouri would have no power to pass
title to Nebraska land. Conversely, if the land was not located in Nebraska,
the court would not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit to
quiet title. The court concluded that the land was in Nebraska and rendered
judgment for the Nebraska claimants, which was affirmed by the Nebraska
Supreme Court.1 5
Three years later the plaintiff instituted a title action in Missouri,
which was removed to the federal court. The lower court concluded that
the land was in Missouri, since the main channel of the river had shifted
by the time that the plaintiff had acquired her title. However, it dismissed
on the grounds that the matter was res judicata, since it has been deter-
mined by the Nebraska court in an action in which the plaintiff had par-
ticipated.116 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, first
pointing out that full faith and credit was not involved and that the ques-
tion was one of res judicata. It thoroughly reviewed the Supreme Court
of law rather than of fact, (3) the court in F-1 was of limited jurisdiction, (4) the
question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated and (5) the policy against court's
acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.
114. 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962).
115. Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959).
116. This being so, it may -be asked why the court decided the substantive
question of where the land was located.
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cases on the subject and concluded that, this being a non-divorce situation,17
the Restatement test was applicable; that being that in certain situations
the policy underlying non-recognition of the jurisdiction of the court whose
judgment is under attack overrides application of the res judicata principle.
Applying the Restatement factors,.11 it concluded that here the policy
against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction was strong. The court
was "concerned with judicial disposition of real estate" and "was confronted
with the traditional policy of immunity of a state's real property from direct
disposition by a sister state's judgment."1 9 It noted that the state itself
was not bound by the res judicata effect of private litigation and that the
state's sovereignty would be indirectly affected by prohibiting determination
in Missouri.
The result is sound, but permitting relitigation should be limited to
a situation such as this. Unless F-2 has a strong interest in deciding the
question, res judicata should operate. In view of Missouri's strong policy
that litigation should be terminated, the Missouri Supreme Court would
probably accept the Restatement position. In the great run of cases, in-
quiry into subject matter jurisdiction would be foreclosed because of the
prior determination, but the court would permit inquiry in a case such as
Duke u. Durfee, where Missouri's sovereignty was strongly affected by the
prior litigation.
Finally, a party may be precluded from attacking a decree for want of
jurisdiction by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In McCsue v. Good-
willie'1 2 0 a decree of a sister state was attacked on the ground that it
passed title to Missouri land, which was beyond the court's power. The
Missouri Supreme Court held that they could not question the decree. A
ground may have been that since they were before the court, the issue
as to the ownership was res judicata.121 But a more cogent reason was that
the assailant had accepted benefits under the decree he was now attacking.
117. There subject matter and judicial jurisdiction are concurrent, since
grounds for divorce are universally determined by the lex fori. The theory is that
the domicile is deciding the status of its domiciliary. Any appearance in a divorce
action precludes relitigation of the jurisdictional queston in F-2. Sherrer v. Sher-
rer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948). See also Cook v. Cook,
342 U.S. 126 (1951).
118. See note 113 supra.
119. See discussion, infra note 202 and accompanying text.
120. 204 Mo. 306, 102 S.W. 997 (1907).
121. See the discussion, infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
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The assailant occupied the other land that was awarded to him and received
other benefits. The court observed as follows:
As will presently be seen, the parties to the Ohio suit having taken
part in a domestic distribution, and having recited in their partition
deeds the Ohio decree, they and their privies are estopped to deny
the finality and conclusiveness of that decree. Having accepted the
decree as final and enjoyed benefits under it, they may not spurn
the latter on which they claimed or disown the cup of which they
drank.122
In the later case of Jones v. Park,123 the court explained the case on col-
lateral estoppel grounds and said the result would have been the same
even if the parties had not been before the Ohio court.12' In addition then
to the requirement that the assailant not have litigated the jurisdictional
question, he must also not have received benefits under the decree so that
he is estopped from now challenging it.125
C. Fraud
It is often stated that a judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit
if jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained by fraud. This statement
is not accurate. Fraud in obtaining jurisdiction does not destroy the court's
jurisdiction to render the judgment, and fraud, as such, is not a defense
to enforcement of a judgment of a sister state.2 26 However, a judgment is
entitled to no greater effect in F-2 than it would have in F-1. Consequently,
if the judgment would be set aside in F-1 or is otherwise voidable because
of the fraud in obtaining jurisdiction, F-2 may refuse to recognize it or
enjoin its enforcement. 27 That this is the test is demonstrated by Jaster
v. Currie.128 There the United States Supreme Court held that Nebraska
had failed to give full faith and credit to an Ohio judgment. Both the
122. 204 Mo. at 303-04, 102 S.W. at 1004.
123. 282 Mo. 610, 222 S.W. 1018 (1920).
124. As to collateral estoppel see also Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26
N.E.2d 290 (1940), prohibiting party who had obtained invalid divorce decree
from asserting invalidity in suit for support by second wife, who had married him
in reliance on the divorce decree.
125. Compare Napton v. Leaton 71 Mo. 358 (1879), where a minor unrepre-
sented by a guardian at the time was permitted to attack probate proceedings in
F-1 to establish her title to Missouri land, even though she received some money
from the estate on the assumption that the defendant would be receiving the land.
126. Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1877).
127. RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcr oF LAws § 440 (1934). See also Levin v. Glad-
stein, 142 N.C. 482, 55 S.E. 371 (1906).
128. 198 U.S. 144 (1905).
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Nebraska court and the Supreme Court proceeded on the assumption that
the issue was whether the judgment would have been impeachable for fraud
in Ohio. The Supreme Court concluded that it would not have been and
reversed.
The Missouri cases are not always clear as to whether the court is
looking to F-1 or the Missouri law to determine fraud. In Ward v. Quin-
livin, 20 for example, one of the first cases dealing with the subject, the
court, in commenting on Christmas v. Russell, concluded that that case
recognized the possibility of a judgment's being impeachable for fraud in
the state of rendition. In any event, the grounds on which Missouri has
refused recognition because of fraud are such as to be grounds for impeach-
ment in probably every state. We will assume then that Missouri is looking
to F-1 in accordance with the constitutional requirement.
The fraudulent conduct must relate to the obtaining of jurisdiction
over the defendant's person. Thus, fraud in obtaining a note upon which
suit was brought and judgment rendered in F-1 is no defense to enforce-
ment,130 nor is the use of perjured testimony by the plaintiff.13 1 One situation
where fraud has been recognized as a defense has been where the plaintiff
led the defandant to believe that suit would not be brought or continued.
In Ward v. Quinlivin, 32 the plaintiff promised to dismiss the suit. When
the defendant was informed of this, he returned to Missouri. The plaintiff
did not dismiss the action as he had agreed to do, and judgment was entered
by default. Enforcement was refused on grounds of fraud. In New York Knee
Pants Co. v. McDonald,"33 the plaintiff had accepted a check in full settle-
ment of his claim and promised to dismiss the case. Instead he obtained
a judgment for a larger amount. The court held that the judgment was
procured by fraud and refused enforcement. In the recent case of Rosenberry
v. Crump,"' a husband and wife had made a property settlement in a
Kansas divorce action. The wife assured the husband that she would not
seek permanent alimony, which promise was incorporated into the settle-
ment. At her suggestion he was not represented by counsel. The court
awarded a lump sum for permanent alimony. The Kansas City Court of
129. 57 Mo. 425 (1874).
130. Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 544, 63 S.W. 489 (En Banc 1901).
131. Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 1, 143 S.W. 458 (En Banc 1912); Field v. San-
derson, 34 Mo. 542 (1864).
132. Supra note 129.
133. 11 S.W.2d 754 (St. L. Mo. App. 1928).
134. 353 S.W.2d 825 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
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Appeals held that enforcement would be refused in Missouri because of
her improper conduct. There could be no doubt that the Kansas courts
would also refuse enforcement.
Improper conduct, designed to prevent the wife's receiving notice of
a divorce action, was involved in Leickty v. Kansas City Bridge Co.,"'5
where in workmen's compensation proceedings the plaintiff claimed that
she was the wife of the decedent. It was contended that they were divorced,
and the husband had indeed obtained a divorce decree. However, the wife
had been served by publication only, due to the husband's false statement
that he did not know her address. After the divorce he led her to believe
they were still married (they were not living together) and had her join
in a conveyance of real estate. The court held that the decree of divorce was
obtained by fraud and that the wife was not bound by it.
In summary, when the judgment has been procured by fraud, it is
not entitled to full faith and credit, assuming it would be set aside for fraud
in F-i. The defendant is not required to have it set aside in F-1, however,
and can collaterally attack the judgment when enforcement is sought in F-2.
D. Statute of Limitations
Enforcement of judgments, just as maintenance of the original cause
of action, may be barred by lapse of time. Both the statute of limitations
of F-1 and F-2 must be considered. Traditionally we think of statutes of
limitation as destroying only the "remedy," while leaving the "right" un-
impaired. 3 This is a peculiarity of common law jurisdictions and has been
severely criticized.1 37 Nonetheless, the principle continues to be accepted,
and ordinarily the fact that the judgment cannot be enforced due to lapse
of time in F-1 will not prevent its enforcement in F-2, if F-2 has a longer
period, since the statute in F-1 merely means the judgment is not enforce-
able there. In some instances, however, the statute of F-1 is interpreted as
a statute of prescription, which destroys the right as well as the remedy.
When this is the case the judgment is not entitled to recognition in F-2.131
135. 354 Mo. 629, 190 S.W.2d 201 (En Banc 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 782
(1946).
136. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 603 (1934).
137. See my discussion of this point and criticism in Sedler, The Erie Outcome
Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 813, 846-851 (1962). The classic criticism will be found in Lorenzen, The
Statute of Limitations and the Conflicts of Laws, 38 YALE L.J. 492 (1919).
138. St. Louis Type Foundry v. Jackson, 128 Mo. 119, 30 S.W. 521 (1895);
Baker v. Stonebreaker's Adm'rs., 36 Mo. 338 (1865).
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The matter of statutory interpretation is difficult, and it is submitted that
no general guidelines can be established by which it is possible to determine
whether the statute is one of prescription.139 Words to the effect that the
judgment became "dormant and ceased to be a lien" have been held to
indicate a statute of prescription.140
Even if the action is not barred by the F-1 statute of limitations, it
cannot be enforced in F-2 if barred by the latter's statute. The statute of
limitations may be a statute of rest or reflect F-2's policy against stale
evidence,141 or both. In any event, F-2 is not required to open its doors to
enforcement of judgments that violate this policy. It was early established
that refusal to enforce a judgment of a sister state, that is barred by F-2's
statute of limitations, is not prohibited by the full faith and credit clause.142
The Missouri statute 43 is expressly applicable to all judgments whether
rendered by Missouri courts, federal courts, courts of sister states, territorial
courts, or courts of foreign states. The limitation period is ten years. The
statute is expressed, however, in terms of presumptions, which could cause
some confusion. The judgment is presumed satisfied after the expiration of
ten years from date of rendition, or ten years from date of revival, or ten
years after date of the last payment on it. But it then says that after
the expiration of that time the judgment shall conclusively be presumed
to be paid and no execution shall be had nor suit brought on the judgment.
A literal reading could raise the question of whether the presumption of
payment could be rebutted after the lapse of time and the action maintained.
However, our supreme court has held to the contrary. In Wormington. v.
City of Monnett, 4' holding that an appeal did not operate to stay the
running of the statute, it stated that the presumption is not rebuttable.
It also construed the statute as destroying the right itself, insofar as a
Missouri judgment is involved, and operating as a statute of prescription
on judgments entered here. As to judgments of other courts or states, it
operates to prevent their enforcement after ten years, even though en-
forcement is not barred in F-1.145
139. See Sedler, op. cit., supra note 137, at 848-49.
140. St. Louis Type Foundry v. Jackson, supra note 138.
141. See the discussion of statutes of limitation in Riddlesbarger v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868).
142. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 311 (1839). Cf. Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
143. § 516.350 RSMo 1959.
144. 358 Mo. 1044, 218 S.W.2d 856 (En Banc 1949).
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f An interesting question arises with respect to judgments of sister states
that have been revived. In Roche v. McDonald,14 the plaintiff's assignor
obtained a judgment against the defendant in June 1918 in the state of
Washington, where the statute of limitations for judgments was six years.
In February, 1924, the judgment was assigned to the plaintiff. He brought
suit on the judgment in Oregon, where personal service was obtained, in
March, 1924. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in that action in
October, 1924. Shortly after recovering the Oregon judgment, the plaintiff
sued in Washington, where the statute of limitations was held to be a bar.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Washington had
failed to give full faith and credit to the Oregon judgment, which, in turn,
had been entered on the original Washington judgment.
It was immaterial that the judgment had expired in Washington, even
if the Washington statute should be construed as extinguishing the right.
Since the Oregon court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter, the court observed that the judgment was valid despite any errors
of law it might have committed, citing Faunterloy v. Lum.14' Since the
second judgment was a new judgment, the statute of limitations would
have to be applied from the date of the Oregon judgment, and at the time
of suit it had, of course, not expired.
The principle is applicable when a judgment has been revived in the
state of rendition. F-2's statute of limitations must have expired as to the
second judgment. In Union National Bank v. Lamb,148 the plaintiff had
obtained a judgment in Colorado, in 1927. He obtained a revivor in Colorado
in 1945. When he sued on the judgment in Missouri in 1948, the court held
that he was barred by the ten year statute of limitations, since under the
Missouri concept of revivor, the 1945 action did not create a new judgment,
nor toll the operation of the statute of limitations. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that if under Colorado law the 1945 action
created a new judgment, the Missouri statute could only run from 1945.
It was immaterial that the Missouri statute of limitations on the original
judgment had expired at the time of revivor if under Colorado law a new
judgment was thereby created. On remand the Missouri Supreme Court
concluded that under Colorado law the 1945 action did not create a new
146. 275 U.S. 449 (1927).
147. 210 U.S. 231 (1908). See the discussion, supra notes 32-37 and accompany-
ing text.
148. 337 U.S. 538 (1949).
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judgment,""0 since there was no service of process on the defendant in
Colorado in the 1945 action. Due to this lack of personal service, the 1945
action could not be treated as creating a new judgment.
The point to note is that F-2's statute of limitations must bar the last
judgment created under the law of F-1.
E. Extraterritorial Suits Involving Personal Representatives
Here the issue is to what extent an F-1 judgment involving a personal
representative-an administrator or executor-will be recognized in a state
other than the one where the representative was serving. There are four
possible situations: (1) the representative was plaintiff and was successful;
(2) the representative was plaintiff and was unsuccessful; (3) the rep-
resentative was defendant and was successful; and (4) the representative
was defendant and was unsuccessful, that is, a judgment was recovered
against him in his representative capacity.
Insofar as full faith and credit is involved, a distinction has been drawn
based upon the conceptual difference between testate and intestate admin-
istration. A judgment rendered against an executor in F-1 is entitled to
full faith and credit when that executor is sued on the judgment in another
state."' However, when judgment is rendered against an administrator, this
judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit in a suit against the ancillary
administrator in F-2.15' The theory is that the administrators are not in
privity. Each is administering assets subject to the jurisdiction of the state
of his appointment, and F-1 cannot bind the assets being administered in
F-2. The judgment is not against the administrator individually, but against
the assets which he is administering; it being analogous to an in rem judg-
ment. A judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a suit by the admin-
istrator, as plaintiff, is not a bar to an independent suit by an ancillary
administrator. 1 2 The executor, however, is deemed to obtain his authority
from the will, even though he may be serving as executor in more than
149. Union Nat. Bank v. Lamb, 360 Mo. 81, 227 S.W.2d 60 (1950).
150. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891). In the earlier case of Hill v.
Tucker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 458 (1851) the court held that while a judgment
against an executor in F-1 was not conclusive against a different executor in F-2, it
was, nonetheless, prima facie evidence of the claim, and it would toll the statute of
limitations in F-2.
151. Stacy v. Thrasher, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 44 (1848). See also Brown v. Fletch-
er's Estate 210 U.S. 82 (1908), which involved an executor and an administrator
c.t.a.; the judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit.
152. Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.S. 335 (1908).
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one state. He receives his initial authority from the will and is legally re-
sponsible for all assets of the decedent wherever situated.
The constitutional situation then is as follows. If an executor is plaintiff
and is successful, the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit when he
sues on it in F-2, assuming he has capacity to sue in F-2. 5'3 If an executor is
plaintiff and unsuccessful, then the judgment would be a bar to a suit in
another state.1 5 4 If an executor is defendant and successful, the judgment
would bar another suit against him elsewhere.-'5 If an executor is defendant
and the claimant prevails, the judgment against the executor is entitled to
recognition in F-2.156 If, on the other hand, the representative is an admin-
istrator, the adverse judgment has no effect beyond F-1. A judgment against
the administrator, as plaintiff, does not bar a suit by another administrator
to collect the claim in another state.157 A judgment against him, as de-
fendant, is not entitled to full faith and credit when sought to be enforced
against the ancillary administrator in F-2.158 A judgment for him, when
sued as a defendant, will not prevent a suit by the same claimant against
an ancillary administrator elsewhere. 5 9 The only time a judgment in an
action involving an administrator has any effect outside F-i is when he is
plaintiff and is successful. Since a claim due the decedent is merged in a
money judgment, recovery by an administrator in F-1 is a bar to an action
by another administrator in F-2.6" And when the foreign administrator is
permitted to sue on a judgment recovered in his representative capacity,'1'
that judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit in his suit against
the defendant in F-2
Not all of these situations have arisen in Missouri. Where the foreign
administrator has recovered a judgment as plaintiff, he is permitted to sue
in Missouri without ancillary administration, and the judgment of F-1 is
153. This follows from Carpenter v. Strange, supra note 150.
154. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 506 (2) (1934).
155. Id. § 511(2) (1934).
156. Id. § 510(2) (1934).
157. Id. § 506(1) (1934).
158. Id. § 510(1) (1934).
159. Id. § 511(1) (1934).
160. Id. § 505 (1934).
161. In the absence of statute most states will permit suits on claims arising out
of transactions after his appointment, but not on claims belonging to the decedent.
Statutes in many states permit suit on the latter. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
Laws §§ 507, 508 (1934). As to Missouri compare Wells v. Davis, 303 Mo. 388, 261
S.W. 58 (1924), with DeMattei v. Missouri-K.T. Ry. Co., 345 Mo. 1136, 139 S.W.2d
504 (1940). See as to recognition, Moore v. Kraft, 179 Fed. 685 (7th Cir. 1912).
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entitled to full faith and credit.16 2 The same is obviously true as to a judg-
ment recovered by an executor. Research has disclosed no cases involving
suits by administrators in Missouri, following an unsuccessful suit by an
administrator elsewhere.10o I would predict that if the defendant were a
Missouri domiciliary sued elsewhere, the Missouri courts would hold the
action by the Missouri administrator barred, and I would hope that the
result would be the same even if the defendant were not a Missouri domi-
ciliary. It is unfair to harass the defendant with repeated suits by per-
mitting him to be sued if he can be served or has property in a state where
there is ancillary administration. The administrators should be acting in
concert and should be in communication. It is inconceivable that the Mis-
souri administrator would be unaware of the suit elsewhere, and he could
assist the F-1 administrator in that suit. It is hoped that Missouri will
hold that a judgment against an administrator as plaintiff in F-1 will bar
another action by the administrator in F-2.
There have been Missouri cases where the representative is the de-
fendant in F-1 and was unsuccessful. The leading case is In re Thompsones
Estate.'10 A judgment was rendered against a Missouri administrator in
a suit in a federal court in Louisiana where he was personally served. The
Missouri Supreme Court held that the judgment was not entitled to full
faith and credit, since F-1 lacked jurisdiction. It relied on section 512 of
the Restatement, which states/declares that an action cannot be maintained
against an administrator on a claim against the decedent outside of the
state of his appointment-15 Since the administrator had no authority out-
side the state of his appointment to bind the assets, his appearance could
not confer jurisdiction. The result and rationale are correct. If there were
assets in Louisiana, the judgment could be satisfied out of those assets. In
some sense a judgment against an administrator can be considered in rem.
Missouri's policy against permitting suits against Missouri administrators
outside of the state justifies the result. When the plaintiff sued the Missouri
administrator in Louisiana, it should have been only with the view toward
162. Titman v. Thornton, 107 Mo. 500, 17 S.W. 97 (1891). Cf. Miller v.
Hoover, 121 Mo. App. 568, 97 S.W. 210 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906). See also the dis-
cussion of Missouri law on this point in Turner v. Alton Banking and Trust Co.,
166 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1948).
163. A defeated executor would, of course, be barred, as the prior discussion
indicates.
164. 339 Mo 410, 97 S.W.2d 93 (1936).
165. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 512 (1934).
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obtaining Louisiana assets in satisfaction. Although the decedent carried
on operations in Louisiana, it did not appear that he had assets there. The
result is not unfair to the plaintiff, who was aware that he was suing a
foreign administrator and through discovery could have probably deter-
mined whether there were assets in the state of suit.16
A different question is presented where the plaintiff has recovered a
judgment against an ancillary administrator. In First National Bank of
Corning v. Dowdy,167 the Springfield Court of Appeals held that a judgment
recovered against an ancillary administrator in Arkansas was not entitled
to full faith and credit in a suit against a Missouri administrator. Here
there was no queston of lack of jurisdiction. There were apparently assets
in Arkansas, as the appointment of an ancillary administrator indicates.
Missouri's policy of prohibiting suits against a Missouri administrator else-
where is not involved. There is no reason to permit relitigation in Missouri,
since F-1 had jurisdiction over the parties and the assets located there. I
would hope that our supreme court would hold the judgment res judicata
and recognize the claim in Missouri. Assuming that administrators would
be in communication, the Missouri administrator would almost certainly
be aware of the action pending in Arkansas. Because there is no question
of jurisdiction and no interference with Missouri's policy that an admin-
istrator appointed by its courts should not be suable elsewhere, the court
should not permit relitigation.
As to foreign suits against the administrator, in which the administrator
was successful, research has also disclosed no Missouri cases. If the plaintiff
sued the Missouri administrator elsewhere, the court to be consistent with
Thompson, would have to hold that there was no jurisdiction, since the
administrator cannot be sued there. Still, it was the plaintiff who initiated
the action there against the Missouri administrator. It does not seem
unfair to hold him estopped from now asserting the lack of jurisdiction in
F-1.168 He invoked the jurisdiction of that court and should now not be
166. See also Rentschler v. Jamison, 6 Mo. App. 135 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878),
where the court observed that a Missouri administrator could not permit a claim
against the estate to be adjudicated in another state. The suit was against the
decedent in his life time and was continued against the administrator, who did not
appear. The court held that Illinois had no power to render a judgment against the
Missouri administrator.
167. 175 Mo. App. 478, 161 S.W. 859 (Spr. Ct. App. 1913).
168. In the same manner as a party who benefitted from a void judgment that
he did not initiate; the fact that the party initiated the proceedings here justifies
the estoppel even absent benefits, since he sought benefits by initiating the action.
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heard to complain of the lack of jurisdiction. Where the suit was against a
foreign administrator and judgment was in his favor, the Missouri courts
should hold the action res judicata. It is neither fair nor sound to permit
suits against the estate in every state where assets are located. Where a
court of another state, having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter has decided against the plaintiff, he should not be permitted to
relitigate his claim in Missouri. Particularly where the decedent was
domiciled here, our courts should not permit the estate to be diminished by
a foreign claimant whose claim was adjudicated against him in another
tribunal.00
In summary as to administrators, it has been decided by our supreme
court that a judgment rendered in favor of a foreign administrator as plain-
tiff is entitled to full faith and credit when sued on in Missouri. Where the
foreign administrator was unsuccessful as plaintiff, it is hoped that our
courts will not permit suit against the defendant here by an ancillary
administrator. Where a judgment is rendered against a Missouri admin-
istrator as defendant elsewhere, that judgment will not be recognized be-
cause of the absence of power in F-1 to bind the assets here. If rendered in
his favor when sued as defendant elsewhere, it is submitted that the plaintiff
should be estopped from suing him again in Missouri. Finally, where suit
involves a foreign administrator as defendant, it is submitted that the
-decision should be res judicata here, whether the decision is for or against
the administrator. A number of questions concerning judgments in suits
involving administrators are now open in Missouri.
F. Judgmwnts of Foreiga States
The question of recognition of judgments of foreign states does not
appear to have arisen in Missouri, and indeed there is scant authority in
any state on the questionY.7 0 Since one of the parties will usually be a citizen
of a foreign state, diversity jurisdiction exists in the federal courts; moreover,
since Missouri is an "inland state," enforcement of foreign judgments is
not as likely to be sought here as for example in New York.
Since the full faith and credit clause is inapplicable to judgments of
169. See also First Nat. Bank v. Blessing, 231 Mo. App. 121, 98 S.W.2d 149
(K.C. Ct. App. 1936), where it was held that a judgment obtained against a foreign
executor in another state is not a bar to a further suit against the Missouri executor
here.
170. The matter is discussed in Reese, Status in this Country of Judgments
Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 783 (1950).
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foreign states, there is no constitutional provision expressly requiring rec-
ognition. The due process clause would, of course, prohibit recognition where
jurisdiction was lacking in the due process sense, unless perhaps both parties
were citizens of F-1.lr1 It has been suggested that the foreign relations
powers of the United States may prohibit the states from acting upon
foreign judgments contrary to the rules imposed by the federal courts, 1 72
but I cannot see where recognition of a judgment in the ordinary civil
action 173 has any effect on our foreign relations policy, and I doubt if the
United States Supreme Court would hold that it has the power to establish
standards for recognition of judgments of foreign states, except as due
process is involved.'" Indeed, in diversity cases it may be that the federal
courts are required to follow the state practice as to recognition of foreign
judgments under the Erie doctrine.' 5
In a pre-Erie case the Supreme Court established the rules for the
federal courts as to recognition of judgments of foreign states. In Hilton v.
Gnyot,176 a French plaintiff sued on a judgment recovered against American
defendants in a French court. There was personal service on the defendants,
and the jurisdiction of the French court was not questioned. The Court
held that an in rem judgment of a foreign court would be conclusive here;
likewise an in persona= judgment rendered against a citizen of F-1 as de-
fcndant, or in favor of the defendant when the F-1 citizen was plaintiff.
But where the F-1 citizen was plaintiff and the defendant was an American,
the judgment would be recognized only if F-1 would recognize as conclusive
a judgment of an American court rendered in favor of an American against
an F-1 national. Since France would treat such a judgment as only "prima
facie evidence of the justice of the plaintiff's claim," we would accord the
same treatment to a French judgment. This doctrine is called "retortion."
It has not found much favor in this country and has been specifically re-
jected in New York, 77 and by statute in California . As far as F-2 is
171. See Gruebel v. Nassauer, 210 N.Y. 149, 103 N.E. 1113 (1913). Though
the court does not talk in constitutional terms, I think the result was constitution-
ally required.
172. Reese, supra note 170 at 777-78 and cases cited therein.
173. Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
174. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912), the court
held that Maine's refusal to recognize a Canadian judgment presented no federal
question.
175. See the brief discussion of this point in Reese, supra note 170 at 792.
176. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
177. Johnson v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E.
121 (1926).
178. See Reese, supra note 170 at 788, note 29.
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concerned, the matter is settled, and there is no reason to permit relitigation
in its courts. At least where F-1 is a "civilized" state, since our policr as
to res judicata prohibits relitigation in our courts, it is of no concern t6
us that F-1 would permit relitigation if suit were brought there on our
judgment. Retortion is a primitive concept, and it is' submitted that it
should not and will not be followed in Missouri if the question should arise.
However, a foreign state is not a sister state, and we may protect
what we consider to be our legitimate interests and that of our citizens
against judgments of foreign states, even though we may not do this as to
judgments of sister states. If a case such as Faunterloy v. LUm 17o were
before a foreign court and the court failed to apply Missouri law properly,
we would, no doubt refuse recognition if the judgment went against a
Missouri citizen. We might hold that our statute of limitations ran against
the original judgment unless there was a valid revivor under our concept
of what constitutes valid revivor.'8 0 We would probably determine the ques-
tion of fraud by our standards. Finally, if we considered the claim on which
the judgment was founded extremely unfair and undesirable, we might
refuse recognition on that count.8 1
The only case that may give any indication as to Missouri policy on
foreign judgments is Grey v. Independent Order of Foresters,- decided
by the Springfield Court of Appeals in 1917. The case will be discussed at
greater length in the next section. When confronted with a Canadian judg-
ment, the court stated that Missouri would recognize a foreign judgment
through comity where there was personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
The court did not discuss retortion, and no reference was made to Hilton
v. Guyot, which had been decided earlier. The court, however, refused to
recognize an Ontario judgment rendered prior to the Missouri judgment,
though after Missouri acquired jurisdiction. As we will see in the next
section, if Ontario had been a sister state, the full faith and credit clause
would have required recognition of its judgment.
It is submitted that the approach taken by the court in that case will
be followed in Missouri if the question should arise. Retortion has no place
179. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
180. See the discussion, su-pra notes 146-49 and accompanying text. See also
the discussion in Reese, supra note 170 at 793-94.
181. Such as that involved in De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cas. 309 (No.
3715) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873), which was rendered pursuant to a French statute re-
quiring a father-in-law to support his son-in-law.
182. 196 S.W. 779 (Spr. Mo. App. 1917).
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in our law and is inconsistent with our policy of res judicata. Consequently,
it is of no concern to use what F-1 would do with our judgment. Since we
deem it desirable that there be an end to litigation, we will recognize the
F-1 judgment as conclusive without considering what F-1 will do. However,
we are not inhibited by the full faith and credit clause from promoting
policies we deem desirable. The requirements of a federal system and the
need for uniform recognition among the several states which, while sovereign
in the conflicts sense, are not sovereign in the national and international
sense, are not present when a foreign state is involved. France is a foreign
state realistically, while Illinois is not. Thus, where we decide that rec-
ognition of the foreign judgment will violate our policies we will refuse
such recognition. But since such a refusal would run counter to our well-
recognized principle of res judicata, the interference with those policies will
have to be most serious.
IV. CONFLICTING JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
A. Conflicts of Jurisdiction
A problem arises when the same case is before two courts. In Morris
v. Jones,.13 defendant was an Illinois unincorporated association authorized
to do business in Missouri. In 1934 the plaintiff sued in Missouri for
malicious prosecution. In 1938, before judgment was obtained in the Mis-
souri action, liquidation proceedings were filed against the association in
Illinois. The Illinois proceedings vested title to all the association's property
in the liquidator, set a time for filing claims against the association and
stayed all suits against it. Counsel for the association withdrew from the
Missouri suit, stating that the Illinois proceedings prevented the suit in
Missouri. The Missouri court disagreed and entered judgment for the plain-
tiff. The claim was disallowed in the Illinois proceedings, despite the con-
tention that it was entitled to full faith and credit.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that full faith and
credit had been denied to the Missouri judgment. There was no question
of priority of claims, nor was the title of the Illinois liquidator to the asso-
ciation's assets in issue. The point was that Illinois had failed to recognize
as valid a claim supported by a judgment of a sister state, which had
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Of course, it was im-
183. 329 U.S. 595 (1948).
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material that the underlying claim would not have been recognized in
Illinois. If the Illinois decree staying suits was to have been recognized in
Missouri, the place to raise that question was before the Missouri courts.
In other words, as between states of the Union, that judgment controls
which is rendered first. So if suit had been brought first in Illinois and then
in Missouri, assuming the Missouri court did not decline jurisdicton, and
Missouri rendered judgment first, that judgment would be entitled to full
faith and credit in the Illinois action.
In Grey v. Independent Order of Foresters,' the latter question was
before the Springfield Court of Appeals in regard to a judgment of a foreign
state. There was a dispute over a suicide provision in an insurance policy.
Suit was instituted in Missouri by the original beneficiary in March, 1915,
and the assignee was substituted as plaintiff in October, 1915. Later in
March, 1915, the insurer sued the original beneficiary in Toronto, Canada,
obtaining personal jurisdiction. In May, 1915, the Canadian court rendered
a judgment resolving the disputed issue in favor of the insurer. It also
enjoined the beneficiary from prosecuting suit elsewhere. In October, 1915,
the Missouri court resolved the disputed issue in favor of the plaintiff,
holding that the Canadian judgment was no bar.
On that point the court of appeals affirmed. The principle was estab-
lished that when two courts have jurisdiction, the one whose jurisdiction
first attaches prevails, and that court will retain jurisdiction to judgment.
The result could not constitutionally be the same if Toronto were a sister
state. Since it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, its
judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit here, and the question
of which court first acquired jurisdiction would be immaterial. As to foreign
states, however, the decision represents Missouri's view as to retention of
jurisdiction, and it is submitted it would be followed by the Missouri
Supreme Court.
B. Conflicting Judgments
Here F-1 and F-2 have both rendered judgments, and the issue is what
F-3 or F-1 may do if the F-1 judgment is challenged by the F-2 judgment.
Where the issue is as to the jurisdiction of either F-1 or F-2 to render the
judgment, F-3 may independently decide which state had jurisdiction. In
Riley v. New York Trust Co.,185 a Delaware corporation sued in Delaware
184. Supra, note 182.
185. 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
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to interplead two administrators, one appointed by Georgia and the other
by New York. Both claimed the right to the decedent's stock in the Dela-
ware corporation. The New York administrator was not a party to Georgia
proceedings which had determined that the decedent was domiciled in
Georgia. New York had earlier determined that the decedent was domiciled
in New York. The Delaware court found that the decedent was domiciled
in New York and awarded the property to the New York administrator.
It was held that Delaware did not deny full faith and credit to the Georgia
proceedings. Since jurisdiction depended upon the domicile of the decedent,
such domicile was a jurisdictional fact, which F-2 or F-3 may always exam-
ine. Conceivably, Delaware could have found that the decedent was domi-
ciled in a third state. So too, if the Georgia decree were in issue in New
York, New York could deny it recognition because of the lack of domicile.218
An entirely different situation would have been presented if the New
York administrator had litigated the jurisdictional question in Georgia. In
Riley, Chief Justice Stone, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson,
concurred on the ground that the New York administrator was not bound
by the Georgia decree, since he was not before the Georgia court. In
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,1 7 it was held that where there were in-
consistent decrees the action of the court rendering the second decree,
where the jurisdictional question was litigated, was entitled to recognition.
The estate of the decedent was being administered in Washington. The
parties, whom we shall call M and T, both claimed the stock in the estate.
M sued T in Idaho, seeking a decree that she was entitled to the stocks as
against T. The Idaho court held that it could take jurisdiction over the
cause, classifying the action as more or less in personam, and gave judgment
for M. Pending the action, M sued in Washington to remove the executor,
who was T's assignor. By a cross-petition the executor claimed the stock.
A judgment was entered in favor of T's assignor in 1935. The action pro-
ceeded to judgment in Idaho, and in 1936 judgment was entered for M
against T. T had challenged the jurisdiction of the Idaho court, and pleaded
the Washington proceedings against M as a bar. The Idaho court con-
cluded that the Washington court did not have jurisdiction to enter the
186. See In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J.Eq. 268, 170 Atl. 601 (1934), aff'd.
memo, sub nom. Dorrance v. Martin, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 At. 902 (1935), aff'd.
116 NJ.L. 362, 184 Atl. 743 E.&A. (1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936). See
also Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
187. 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
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decree and refused recognition. Apparently this was based on the lack of
power of the probate court, rather than because of any constitutional ob-
jection. The power of the probate court had not definitely been established
by the state supreme court in that case, and the Idaho court decided that
it lacked jurisdiction under Washington law.",, Subsequently, T sued M in
Washington, alleging that the Idaho decree was void. The corporation then
filed the interpleader bill in the federal court.
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, it was held
that the Idaho decree was binding on the parties. The issue of Washington's
jurisdiction to issue the decree had been litigated in Idaho by the defendant
and decided adversely to him. It was noted that he did not petition for
certiorari from the final determination in Idaho, though he had from an
earlier one. s18 He was, therefore, precluded from relitigating the question.
Had the Washington court, if the suit were before it, permitted such relitiga-
tion, it would have denied full faith and credit to the Idaho decree. It
was not disputed that the Washington decree would have had to be rec-
ognized in the Idaho case if the Washington court had jurisdiction, since it
was rendered first. But the finding that the Washington court did not have
jurisdiction was conclusive on T, who had litigated it in Idaho. Thus, a
litigation of the question of F-I's jurisdiction in F-2 precludes its relitigation
in F-3 or in F-1, just as a litigation of jurisdiction in F-1 precludes its
relitigation in F-2.
With this in mind, let us consider the holding in Grimm v. Barring-
tonu.' 00 B sued R in Missouri to cancel a contract for services that R was
performing for her, and judgment was for B. R then sued B in New Jersey,
joining an insurance company as garnishee, to recover on a quantum meruit
theory for services performed prior to repudiation. In the New Jersey action
judgment was for R. P, a creditor of R, sued B in Missouri as garnishee,
setting up the New Jersey judgment against B as proof of B's liability to R.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals refused to recognize the New Jersey judg-
ment despite P's claim that the New Jersey court decided that the Missouri
judgment did not bar quantum meruit recovery against B. The court con-
cluded that the Missouri judgment did hold such recovery was barred and
that the New Jersey decision was directly opposed to that of Missouri.
Full faith and credit, it said, did not require Missouri to recognize a judg-
188. Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087 (1936).
189. 308 U.S. at 77.
190. 109 Mo. App. 35, 84 S.W. 357 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904).
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ment that conflicted with a Missouri decision rendered on the identical
issue. But B was a party to the New Jersey proceedings. The suit was begun
by garnishment, and she elected to come in and defend. The court observed
that she did not appeal the New Jersey decision. Her claim that New
Jersey denied full faith and credit to the Missouri decree was decided
against her in New Jersey. Her remedy was to appeal and petition the
Supreme Court for certiorari. Failing to do so, she should not have been
permitted to relitigate the question in Missouri, and if the case were to
arise today, it would have to be decided differently.
In summary, a judgment rendered by a sister state must be recognized
even if F-2 acquired jurisdiction first or the judgment otherwise interferes
with the operation of proceedings in F-2. Conflicting judgments must be
examined in terms of jurisdiction. The conflict must be resolved in jurisdic-
tional terms, but if a party has litigated the question of jurisdiction or any
other question in F-2, he cannot relitigate it in F-I, nor F-3, and is bound
by the F-2 determination.
V. DECREES
It is here that the law is in a state of flux and the requirements of full
faith and credit may be less confining. We have earlier defined a decree
as anything other than an unconditional court order requiring the immediate
payment of a sum certain in money.""1 This is a functional, rather than a
historical definition. Historically, judgments were issued by the law courts
and decrees by the equity courts. Thus, an order in replevin or ejectment
would be denominated a judgment, while an award of damages by an
equity court would be denominated a decree. The problems as to recognition
have involved "equity" decrees, other than those for the payment of dam-
ages. Our use of the term decree will be in the functional sense; only the
situs has subject matter jurisdiction to issue an order in ejectment, so there
is no problem of recognition; nor are there any special problems as to
replevin orders.
A. Constitutional Requirements
The requirements of full faith and credit are equally applicable to
decrees. The historical concept that "equity acts in personam" has no signif-
icance here. A decree binds the parties and not only their "consciences."
191. See the discussion, supra note 4.
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In Sistare v. Sistare,12 the United States Supreme Court made it clear that
the full faith and credit clause requires recognition of an alimony decree
as to past due installments, reaffirming an earlier holding to the same effect
in Barber v. Barber.'9 ' An award of alimony is an equitable action; since
payment is to be in installments and it may be subject to modification, the
action historically had to be maintained in the chancery courts, which also
had divorce jurisdiction. The court observed that as installments become
due, the right to them becomes vested, and is, therefore, protected by the
full faith and credit clause. That an equity decree for a sum certain in
money is entitled to full faith and credit was expressly decided in Missouri
prior to Sistare.'0' A decree for future installments of alimony is not entitled
to full faith and credit, since at the time of suit the right is not vested,
as the decree is subject to modification in the state of rendition. 19 5 Past
installments are not entitled to recognition if they are still subject to mod-
ification in the state of rendition. 98 The point is that the historical nature
of the decree as "equitable" has nothing to do with the question of full
faith and credit. If a decree is not to be recognized, it must be for other
reasons. The most frequent questions outside the family law area, which
is subject to special treatment and will not be discussed here, 9 7 involve
decrees affecting foreign land and antisuit injunctions.
B. Extraterritorial Land Decrees
In a suit between A and B in an F-1 court having jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of the case, e.g., construction of a will of an
F-1 domiciliary, the court decides that A is entitled to land located in Mis-
souri. The question arises as to what effect Missouri will give the decree
when the successful party seeks to establish his title in Missouri.
We must begin with a consideration of Fall v. Eastin,198 the only
United States Supreme Court case on the subject. This is a wonderful case
for teaching purposes as it shows how a lawyer's mistakes can cause the
192. 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
193. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
194. Brisbane v. Dobson, 50 Mo. App. 170 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
195. Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901). It may, nonetheless, be enforced
in F-2. See, e.g. Light v. Light, 12 Ill.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1958).
196. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944), where the past installments were
found to be non-modifiable. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring, took the position
that past installments were entitled to recognition unless modified in F-1.
197. They will be discussed elsewhere in the Symposium.
198. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
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court to decide the case against his client by confusing the court as to the
real issue involved. Suit was brought in Nebraska to cancel a mortgage
and quiet title to land situated there. The plaintiff had obtained a divorce
in Washington, which was the matrimonial domicile. As part of the decree
the Washington court ordered the husband to execute a deed to the wife
to satisfy a division of the marital property. When he failed to do so, the
court under an appointive statute appointed a commissioner to execute
a deed to the land located in Nebraska. 99 In the meantime the husband
had conveyed the land to the defendant after giving a mortgage to her.
Apparently she had no notice of the Washington order. In any event, the
Nebraska Supreme Court refused to recognize the Washington decree as
vesting title in the plaintiff. The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that full faith and credit did not require the Nebraska court to
vest title in the plaintiff based on the Washington decree. The case and
the problem of recognition of foreign land decrees have been extensively
discussed by many writers, the discussion by Professor Currie particularly
being excellent,200 and need not be discussed at great length here. Suffice
it to say that counsel for the plaintiff tried to persuade the Supreme Court
that the Washington decree passing title to Nebraska land was in and of
itself entitled to full faith and credit. Of course this is not so. No state but
the situs can by its decree pass or void title to land, and this point had
earlier been decided by the Supreme Court.21 The court held that the
findings were not required to be given res judicata effect in a suit in
Nebraska to determine title to Nebraska land. The court gave no con-
vincing reasons for its decision, and seemed to say that the "equities" given
by the Washington court, as to Nebraska land, did not have to be rec-
ognized by Nebraska when title was in issue there.
Of course the decree could not operate as a conveyance of Nebraska
land because of the absence of Washington's power over the land. But it
was conclusive as between the parties and their privies as to who had the
right to have the land.20 2 Since the action was one to quiet title, the adju-
199. Where the defendant has failed to convey, the sit-s can issue an in rem
decree passing tile. See e.g., Garfein v. McInnis, 248 N.Y. 261, 162 N.E. 73 (1928).
200. Currie, Full Fait, and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REv.
620 (1954). The ideas expressed in this portion of my article closely follow those
of Professor Currie. See also Barbour, The Extraterritorial Effect of the Equitable
Decree, 17 MicH. L. REv. 527 (1919).
201. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891).
202. Justice Holmes concurred, though he disagreed with the holding. He held
that the decision could rest on an adequate state ground, namely, that Nebraska
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dication that the plaintiff had title to the land as against the husband and
his privies, assuming notice, should have been given full faith and credit.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent the situs from treating the findings
as res judicata,20 3 and some courts have so held.2N It is immaterial to the
situs who has title, as there is no question of a conflicting grant of title
from the situs.2 0 5 Fall v. Eastin may be limited by the principle of stare
decisis to the holding that the Washington court did not have the power
to pass title by its decree to the Nebraska land, or can be explained by
Justice Holmes's concurrence that the Nebraska decision rested on an
adequate state ground, i.e., that the defendant was a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice of the wife's rights. If the question were to arise
today, it is submitted that the finding that the wife was entitled to the
land as against the husband and his privies, would be subject to the require-
ment of full faith and credit.
The principle is equally applicable to an order of F-1 requiring the
defendant to execute a conveyance to land in F-2 in an action for specific
performance or the like. If the defendant executes the conveyance under
court order, of course, it will be recognized as a matter of substantive law,
since court compulsion is not recognized as duress, and the conveyance is
otherwise valid.208 F-2 need not give the same remedy as did F-i, e.g.,
specific performance, since the question of what remedy to give must be
found the defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice, and thus
was not bound by the adjudication against his transferror, which only served to
give the wife "equitable title."
203. Roller v. Murray, 234 U.S. 738 (1914). Since F-1 had jurisdiction over
the parties it could issue an in personam decree, which F-2 may recognize con-
sistent with due process. Thus, F-2's treating as conclusive a decree of F-1 holding
that the plaintiff was not entitled to have a trust enforced in F-2 land raised no
federal question.
204. See, e.g., Matson v. Matson, 187 Iowa 607, 173 N.W. 127 (1919); Weesner
v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); McElreath v. McElreath, 162
Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961). The Nebraska court explained the Fal case on
the grounds that (1) Washington did not have power to pass by court decree title
to Nebraska land and (2) at that time the Nebraska courts did not have the
power to award realty as part of a divorce decree. Since the Nebraska court now
had the power and since the parties were before the court in F-i, the decree was
res judicata and according to the court, entitled to full faith and credit. For
cases expressing the contrary view, namely that the decree involving F-2 land is
entitled to no effect, see Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N.J.Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1894); Clouse v. Clouse, 185 Tenn. 666, 207 S.W.2d 576 (1948).
205. Cf. Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962), and the discussion, s1upra
notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
206. See Phillips v. Phillips 224 Ark. 225, 272 S.W.2d 433 (1954); Deschenes
v. Tallman, 248 N.Y. 33, 161 N.E. 321 (1928).
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decided by the court asked to grant the remedy.207 If F-2 feels that damages
are adequate for breach of a contract to convey land, then full faith and
credit does not require it to resort to specific relief with more severe sanc-
tions. If it would grant specific performance in the case of other land con-
tracts, however, it would be required to do so here, but it is not required
to give a remedy that it does not give to parties in its own courts. The
question is academic, since specific performance is granted, as of course, in
land contracts. A number of cases have applied this principle and have
granted specific performance based on a F-1 decree ordering specific per-
formance of a contract to convey F-2 land.20 8
The Missouri Supreme Court has decided that it will treat a foreign
land decree as any other, that is, as conclusive between the parties. Apple-
gate v. Brown, 20 9 was an action to quiet title to Missouri land. The plain-
tiff claimed that a part of her son's will, which devised his share of the
land to trustees, violated the rule against perpetuities. In a prior action
before the Nebraska court, in which the plaintiff was a party, it was held
that the provision, as construed, did not violate the Missouri rule against
perpetuities. The court decided, therefore, that title to the land was in the
trustees. The Nebraska decree was held to be conclusive, since all parties
to the Missouri suit were before the Nebraska court. It was immaterial
that the effect of the decree was to determine title to Missouri land. In
the earlier case of McCu e v. Goodwillie,210 the court expressed the same
view, though the case has been explained on grounds of collateral estoppel.211,
In a suit in Tennessee, a decree was rendered setting aside a conveyance
to Missouri land. Obviously the decree could not a propriore vigore change
the title in Missouri. However, the decree was res judicata as to the rights.
of the parties. The court observed:
They had their day in a court of equity having jurisdiction of their
persons. It had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and could bind
and did bind the conscience of every party to the suit. While the
207. See RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICr o LAws § 449 (1934). As to the application,
of the same principles for choice of law purposes, see Sedler, op. cit., note 137 supra,
at 826.
208. Hicks v. Corbet, 130 Cal. App.2d 87, 278 P.2d 77, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 965
(1955); Burnely v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873). See also Bailey v. Tully,
242 Wis. 226, 7 N.W.2d 837 (1943). And see RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcr oF LAWS
449(2) (1934).
209. 344 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1961).
210. 204 Mo. 306, 102 S.W. 997 (1907).
211. See the discussion, suprt note 123 and accompanying text.
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decree could not directly affect the bare legal title to land in Mis-
souri, yet it could and did conclude the parties on every issue it
could ...212
It is clear then that Missouri will treat as res judicata a decree of another
state involving Missouri land, when that state had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter. This is so, irrespective of whether the result
is required by full faith and credit.
C. Anti-suit Injunctions
Here F-1 has enjoined a party from enforcing a claim or judgment in
another state. From the earliest times of chancery practice the court has
recognized its power to enjoin persons from prosecuting suits or enforcing
judgments, either in the same state when law and equity were separate,
or in other states.213 When sued in F-2, either after the anti-suit injunction
was issued in F-i, or when the F-1 injunction was issued after suit was
begun in F-2, the defendant sets up the F-1 injunction as a bar to prosecu-
tion of the action. It is assumed that such injunctions are not entitled to
full faith and credit, and ordinarily they are not. This is not because an
anti-suit injunction "merely binds the consciences" of the parties, 21 but
because the F-1 determination is not on the merits. Usually an anti-suit
injunction will be granted because it is unfair to require the defendant to
defend in the state where the plaintiff is suing or because the case can be
more conveniently tried in F-1. It should be noted that the Missouri
courts are very chary about issuing anti-suit injunctions.2 15 But, where a
merits determination takes the form of an anti-suit injunction, then full
faith and credit is required. In Dobson v. Pearce,2 1 the plaintiff brought
212. 204 Mo. at 336, 102 S.W. at 1005.
213. See the discussion in Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N.J.Eq. 94, 43 Ati. 97
(1899). See also Lord Portarlington v. Soulby [1843] Chan. 3 Myline & Keen 104.
214. The concept that "equity acts in personam" has meaning in this situa-
tion. F-i obviously cannot bind the F-2 courts just as the historic chancery courts
could not bind the law courts. But it can bind "th-e person of the defendant" and
punish him for contempt if he prosecutes the suit.
215. See State ex rel. New York, C. & St.L.R.R. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 55
S.W.2d 272 (1932) (could not enjoin party who had obtained injunction in In-
diana against plaintiff's enforcement of claim in Missouri from prosecuting con-
tempt proceedings in Indiana); Grey v. Independment Order of Foresters, 196
S.W. 779 (Spr. Mo. App. 1917) (dictum) (would not isue injunction against
prosecuting foreign suit where Missouri acquired jurisdiction first). Compare the
attitude of the Illinois courts as evidenced by James v. Grand Trunk Western
Railroad, 14 Ill.2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958).
216. 12 N.Y. 156 (1854).
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suit in New York on a judgment earlier obtained by his assignor. The de-
fense was asserted that the judgment was obtained by fraud. When the
assignor had sued to enforce the judgment in Connecticut, the Connecticut
court found that the judgment had been obtained by fraud and enjoined
its enforcement elsewhere. The New York court held that the action was
barred. The issue of fraud had been litigated in Connecticut and decided
adversely to the plaintiff's assignor. The full faith and credit clause
prohibited relitigation in New York, even though the Connecticut decree
took the form of an anti-suit injunction.17 So too if F-1 would enjoin en-
forcement of a negotiable instrument by the payee on the ground that it
was obtained by fraud, this represents a merits determination, and the issue
of fraud could not be relitigated if enforcement were sought in F-2.
Ordinarily, however, the anti-suit injunction is not on the merits, and
the issue is whether F-2 will, in the literal sense, extend "comity" to the
F-1 determination by refusing to entertain a suit on the claim in its courts.
Though the findings of fact as to vexatiousness and the like are res judicata,
F-2 will generally not refuse to entertain the suit because of the F-1 adjudi-
cation that it should not be brought in F-2, and Missouri follows that ap-
proach."" However, there may be situations where the anti-suit injunction
of F-1 will be respected. In Strubinger v. Mid-Union Indemnity Co. 219 the
plaintiff, an attorney, alleged that he had performed various services for the
defendant, an Illinois insurance corporation now in conservatorship, for
which he was not paid. He instituted garnishment proceedings against the
corporation's debtor in Missouri. Proceedings had been previously instituted
in Illinois under the conservatorship to rehabilitate the corporation. All per-
sons having claims against the corporation were enjoined from instituting
suit against it pending rehabilitation. Apparently, the plaintiff was before
the Illniois court; in any event, it was pointed out that he did not contest
Illinois' personal or subject matter jurisdiction.
217. See the valuable discussion in Note, Extraterritorial Recognition of Foreign
Antis~uit Injunctions, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 552 (1961).
218. Kepner v. Cleveland, C. & St. L. Ry., 332 Mo. 299, 15 S.W.2d 825 (En
Banc 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 546 (1929); Lindsey v. Wabash Ry., 61 S.W.2d
369 (K.C. Ct. App. 1933); Grey v. Independent Order of Foresters, supra note
215. In the Kepner case, F-1 had enjoined the plaintiff from prosecuting an FELA
claim in Missouri. In Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942), it was
held that the statute prohibited a state from enjoining prosecution of an FELA
claim in a sister state. See also Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941),
involving state anti-suit injunctions against proceeding in the federal courts.
219. 352 S.W.2d 397 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
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In a well-reasoned opinion the St. Louis Court of Appeals refused to
permit the suit. Though it talked in terms of full faith and credit, it did
not indicate the result was constitutionally required,220 and of course, it was
not, since the Illinois ruling did not represent a merits determination. It
took the position that an action to enforce the right against property in
liquidation should be brought only before the liquidating court. If the
plaintiff was permitted to enforce his right against the garnishee, he would
be given a preference against other creditors. It was not Missouri's policy
to give its residents preferences over foreign creditors. The result is sound
and shows proper consideration for the interests of a sister state.
Assuming, as I think it will, the reasoning of this case will be followed,
Missouri will not automatically refuse recognition of anti-suit injunctions
not on the merits, but will consider whether proper respect for the interests
of a sister state or the litigants justifies refusal to entertain the suit in Mis-
souri because of the issuance of the injunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of recognition of foreign judgments and decrees must be
approached first, with an eye toward the requirements of full faith and
credit when, as usually is the case, F-1 is a sister state. In order for a fed-
eral system, such as ours, to function properly, we must not treat sister
states as "foreign sovereignties." This, coupled with our policy of res judicata,
means that with very few exceptions, a judgment rendered by a court with
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter will be recognized in
Missouri. Even when the mandate of full faith and credit is not clear, our
policy of res judicata generally precludes collateral attack. But the lawyer
must carefully examine the permissible grounds of attack in order to prevent
enforcement against his client of a judgment of a court lacking the power
to bind him.
Except for certain questions of family law, not discussed herein, recog-
nition of foreign judgments and decrees then involves an area of fairly
settled law, and most unresolved points are likely to be determined in
favor of recognition. Such results are in accord with the necessities of a
federal system and our strong policy that there be an end to litigation.
220. Sometimes courts use full faith and credit in the generic rather than
the constitutional sense, i.e., say they will extend full faith and credit when they
mean that they will recognize the F-1 action.
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